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The international literature on minimum wage greatly lacks empirical evidence from developing countries.  In 
Brazil, not only are increases in the minimum wage large and frequent - unlike the typically small increases 
focused upon in most of the existing literature - but also the minimum wage has been used as anti-inflation policy 
in addition to its social role.  This paper estimates the effects of the minimum wage on employment using monthly 
household data (similar to the US CPS) from 1982 to 2000 aggregated at regional level.  A number of conceptual 
and identification questions are discussed as tentative explanation of the non-negative estimates found in the 
literature, for example:  (1) The superiority of “spike” over “fraction affected” and “Kaitz index” as a minimum 
wage variable;  (2) Political variables as excluded exogenous instruments;  (3) Decomposition of the minimum 
wage employment effect into hours worked and number of jobs effects.  (4) Informal and public sectors sorting 
robustness checks.  Robust results to various alternative specifications and instrumental variables indicate that an 
increase in the minimum wage has moderately small adverse effects on employment. 
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  1 There is currently not much consensus on the direction of the employment effects.  The old 
debate between Stigler (1946) and Lester (1946), dormant since the early 80s in an apparent 
consensus of negative significant but modest effects on employment (Brown, Gilroy and 
Kohen, 1982) has been re-awakened.  On the one hand, Neumark and Wascher (1992) and 
Deere et al. (1995), among others, find results consistent with the standard model prediction of 
a negative employment effect.  On the other hand, Card and Krueger (1995) and Dickens et al. 
(1999), among others, challenge such a prediction, unable to find disemployment effects.   
Explanations to non-negative effects range from theory to empirical identification and data issues (Card and 
Krueger, 1995; Brown, 1999).  In a recent survey, Brown (1999, p.2154) remarks:  “the minimum-
wage effect is small (and zero is often hard to reject)”.  While there is yet no consensus, small 
employment effects, clustered around zero, are becoming prevalent in the literature (Freeman, 
1994 and 1996; Brown, 1999).  
In studies for Brazil, in line with the international empirical literature, an increase in the 
minimum wage does not always have a significant effect on employment and it is not always 
negative, inspite of sizeable wage effects (Camargo, 1984; Velloso, 1988; Neri, 1997; Carneiro, 
2000; Carneiro, 2002; Corseuil and Servo, 2002).  Using national aggregate data, this literature 
estimates average wage and employment effects relying on the so-called ad hoc identification, 
which depends on restrictions on time modeling, predominant in the early time series literature.  
This paper estimates the effects of the minimum wage on employment using panel data 
techniques and monthly Brazilian household data from 1982 to 2000 at regional level.  It 
contributes to the Brazilian and international literature in a number of ways.   
First, this paper uses a Brazilian household-level data set (PME) only recently released for 
public use and not yet used for studies of the minimum wage in Brazil.   
Second, this paper discusses a number of conceptual and identification questions as tentative 
explanations of the non-negative employment effects found in the literature.  For example:   
(1) A national minimum wage cannot explain variation in employment across regions (Brown 
et al., 1982; Card and Krueger, 1995; Burkhauser et al., 2000).  Identification of the effect of 
the minimum wage separately from the effect of other variables on prices requires regional 
variation if no restriction on time modeling is imposed.  This motivates the use of “spike” as a 
minimum wage variable, which is here argued to be superior to the commonly used “Kaitz 
index” and “fraction affected”.   
(2) Identification of the effect of the minimum wage separately from the effect of unobserved 
regional macro fixed effects on prices requires modeling fixed effects.  This paper uses panel 
data techniques, scarce in the minimum wage literature, to account for this.   
(3) The minimum wage variable and employment might be simultaneously determined.   
Identification of the effect of the minimum wage separately from the effect of unobserved 
variables on employment requires consistent estimation if such endogeneity bias is to be 
corrected for.  Put differently, rather than capturing a descriptive relationship - which asks: if a 
person is taken at random from the population, what is his/her expected hours of work, given 
the level of the minimum wage? - the instrumented model captures a behavioural relationship - 
which asks:  if the same person is taken from the population, knowing which region he/she 
comes from (i.e., controlling for observed and unobserved regional effects), and the minimum 
wage is increased by 1%, by how much would his/her hours of work be expected to 
increase/decrease?  This paper suggests a number of political variables – not previously 
suggested in the literature - as excluded exogenous instruments to control for endogeneity.  (4) This paper formalizes an employment decomposition that separately estimates the hours 
worked and the number of jobs effects; if the first is positive and the second is negative, this 
could be an explanation of non-negative (total) employment effects.  Such decomposition has 
not been previously formalized in the literature.   
(5) This paper performs robustness checks accounting for sorting into the informal and public 
sectors, scarce in the literature.  Again, if formal sector employment effects are negative and 
informal sector positive, this could be an explanation of non-negative (net) employment effects.   
Third, this paper also contributes to the existing (mainly US) literature by estimating the 
minimum wage effects for a key non-US example.  There are compelling reasons to study the 
minimum wage outside the US.   
(1) “No single empirical study of an economic phenomenon is ever highly convincing” 
(Hamermesh, 2002, p. 4).   Many data points are needed - many and independent data points 
are needed.  This is an unbiased way of extending the understanding of minimum wage effects.  
Unfortunately, however, the international literature on minimum wage is scanty on non-US 
empirical evidence; using Brazilian data is a way of assessing the robustness of findings for the 
US.  Hamermesh (2002, p. 15) argues for increased reliance on non-US data and policy 
evaluations: “policies like hours legislation and the minimum wage provide especially fruitful 
areas in which to apply the results of studying foreign experiences to the US”.   
(2) Hamermesh (2002) remarks that foreign experiences are especially fruitful if they generate 
exogenous shocks (an alternative to reliance on statistical methods to justify exogeneity), as is 
the case in Brazil over the past 30 years.   
(3) Hamermesh (2002) calls attention for the evidence from developing countries, for example, 
Brazil.  If the international literature is scanty on non-US empirical evidence, it is greatly 
lacking on developing countries.   
(4) Minimum wage increases in Brazil are large and frequent, unlike the typically small 
increases focused upon in most of the literature (Deere et al, 1996; Hamermesh, 2002; Castillo-
Freeman and Freeman (1992).  Studying such increases allows a better possibility of observing 
the negative effects predicted by theory and thus the link between empirical data and the 
economic models of the minimum wage.   
(5) Special features of the Brazilian Economy are valuable for case studies of the role of the 
minimum wage in presence of: a (low and) high inflation; a large informal market; a large 
proportion of minimum-wage-civil-servants; and a strong link between benefits and pensions, 
and the minimum wage.  This unique data is a result of the very important role the minimum 
wage plays in Brazil – it has been used as an anti-inflation policy in addition to its traditional 
social role (Macedo and Garcia, 1978, 1979; Camargo, 1984; Foguel, 1997; Carneiro, 2000).   
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the data.  Section 3 describes the 
minimum wage in Brazil (Section 3.1) and discusses identification (Section 3.2).  Section 4 
estimates descriptive models.  Section 5 further discusses identification: lags of the endogenous 
variable are used as instruments under the assumption of errors serially uncorrelated (Section 
5.1); and political variables are used instead as exogenous excluded instruments when this 
assumption is relaxed (Section 5.2).  Further robustness checks, accounting for sorting into 
informal (Section 6.1) and public sectors (Section 6.2) are performed.  Robust results indicate 
moderately small employment effects. 
 
  3 2. DATA 
The data used is from PME (Monthly Employment Survey).  Between 1982 and 2000, 
PME interviewed over 21 million people across the six main Brazilian metropolitan regions:  
Bahia (BA), Pernambuco (PE), Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Sao Paulo (SP), Minas Gerais (MG) and 
Rio Grande do Sul (RS).  Its monthly periodicity is important because wage bargains during the 
sample period occurred annually, bi-annually, quarterly and even monthly, depending on the 
inflation level and indexation rules.  The deflator, INPC (National Consumers Price Index), was 
regionally disaggregated (IPC) to reduce measurement error.
2 
The data design is similar to the US CPS (Current Population Survey).  Every household is 
interviewed in the first 4 months, not interviewed in the next 8, and again interviewed in the 
next 4 months.  This guarantees (a) that 75% of the households are the same in any two 
consecutive months, and (b) that every two years 100% of the sample is repeated.
3  T h i s  
scheme allows monthly, yearly, and seasonal comparisons (IBGE, 1983 and 1991).
4  
Comparisons of demographic and economic characteristics across regions or waves show no 
selectivity bias in any direction (Neri, 1996).  
 
3. MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLES  
3.1 MINIMUM WAGE IN BRAZIL 
The minimum wage was introduced in 1940 as a social policy to provide the minimum 
diet, transport, clothing, and hygiene for an adult worker.  The price of this minimum basket 
varied across regions, which was reflected in 14 minimum wages - the highest (lowest) for the 
Southeast (Northeast) (Foguel, 1997). Wells (1983, p. 305) believes they were “generous 
relative to existing standards” since about 60% to 70% of workers earned below them.  In 
contrast, Saboia (1984) and Oliveira (1981) believe they legitimated the low wages of the 
unskilled.   
The minimum basket price was the criteria for the introduction of the minimum wage, but 
not for its adjustments.  There are two main reasons for the erosion of the real minimum wage 
over time.  The first one has been the failure in adjustments to keep pace with inflation.  After a 
steep decrease, the real minimum wage was adjusted and reached its peak during the boom of 
the 50s, when productivity was high, unions strong, and the Government populist.  After that, it 
decreased as a result of the subsequent recession, rising inflation, and non-aggressive unions 
(Singer, 1975).  The real minimum wage was then 40% lower than in the 50s.   
Its social role changed when the dictatorship installed in 1964 associated high inflation 
with wage adjustments.  That is because minimum wage increases affect production costs and 
prices, not only through its direct effect on minimum wage workers, but also through indirect 
                                                            
2 Because IPC is centered on the 15
th, and wages are usually paid on the 5
th of the month, a geometric mean was 
used to center the IPC on 1
st.  See Neri (1995) and Azzoni et al. (1998) for deflator choices and deflation method 
in the presence of high inflation in Brazil (from 1982 to 2000, inflation was approximately 5,000,000,000,000%).  
3 The flow was twice interrupted:  in August 1988, the sample was reduced by 20%, and in October 1993, the 
Census selected a new sample, fully implemented by January 1994.  Thus, the panels are 100% different in 
January 1993 and January 1994.  Furthermore, new sectors were selected whenever panels were exhausted, and 
households within sectors were substituted in areas of extreme violence. 
4 To perform such comparisons at an individual level, and because it was unavailable in the data, a panel identifier 
had to be constructed.  The identifier is necessary because there is no guarantee that the same individual will live 
in the same house for 16 consecutive months or answer the 8 waves.   
  4 spillover effects (Brown, 1999).  The dictatorship limited labour organization, reduced wage 
militancy, and implemented a centralized wage policy.  One of the strategies of this policy was 
to control nominal increases (Macedo and Garcia, 1978); the minimum wage was transformed 
“from a social policy designed to protect the worker’s living standard into an instrument for 
stabilization policy” (Camargo, 1984, p.19).  According to Carneiro and Faria (1998), the 
minimum wage was used not only as a stabilization policy but also as a coordinator of the wage 
policy.  One example of this role is that other wages were set as multiples of the minimum 
wage.  Another example is that in the early 80s, wages in the range 1 to 3 minimum wages 
were bi-annually adjusted by 110% of the inflation rate; the higher the worker’s position in the 
wage distribution, the lower the percentage adjustment.  Such increases immediately spilled 
over higher up the wage distribution.  The minimum wage then became an indexer; its effects 
were no longer limited to the bottom of the distribution as when it plays a social role.
5  In the 
presence of high inflation and distorted relative prices, rational agents take increases in the 
minimum wage as a signal for price and wage bargains - even after law forbade its indexer role 
in 1987.
6   
The second main reason for the erosion of the real minimum wage over time has been its 
impact on the public deficit - uncontrollably large and growing in the 80s and 90s - via 
benefits
7, pensions, and the Government wage bill (comprising a large proportion of minimum 
wage civil servants
8).  This has often been the criterion for the affordable increase in the 
minimum wage.  
Because it affects both prices and the public deficit, the real minimum wage was decreased 
(by erosion of the nominal minimum wage) to control both, ultimately, to counter inflation.  
However, when pressure was enough, the Government had to give in, allowing increases in the 
nominal minimum wage, which in turn severely affected both prices and the public deficit; 
ultimately, raised inflation.  This effect was perpetuated into an inflation spiral.  The anti-
inflation policy became inflationary itself; the remedy became the disease.
9  Thus, the 
minimum wage has been alternately used as social and anti-inflation policy in Brazil.  The 
policy choice depended (a) on the level of inflation, (b) on the bargaining power of the workers, 
and (c) on the party affiliation of the Government (Velloso, 1988; Bacha, 1979).  The social 
role is associated with more populist Governments, lower inflation, and stronger unions.   
Graph 3.1a summarizes the hourly real minimum wage between 1982 and 2000.
10  Its 
highest level was in November 1982, before the acceleration of inflation, and its lowest level in 
                                                            
5 The increase in inequality revealed in the 1970 Census was associated with the decreases in the minimum wage - 
the so called “Teoria do Farol” (Souza and Baltar, 1979, 1980a and 1980b; Wells; 1983, Bacha, 1979; Camargo, 
1984; Saboia, 1983; Macedo and Garcia, 1978 and 1979). 
6 See Card and Krueger (1995) and Wolf and Nadiri (1981) on indexation and reinforced inflationary expectations. 
7 The Netherlands and Spain also have benefits linked to the minimum wage (Dolado et. al, 1997). 
8 In the sample period, 12% of the population are pensioners, 7% are civil servants. 
9 First, inflation eroded the real minimum wage and triggered nominal minimum wage bargains.  Then the 
subsequent increase: (a) increased the public deficit, and (b) was a signal for price and wage bargains.  Both these 
increased inflation, which in turn eroded the nominal minimum wage and triggered new nominal minimum wage 
bargains.   
10 The hourly minimum wage (wage) rate is the monthly minimum wage (earnings) divided by 44*4.3 after, and 
48*4.3 before, the Constitution of 1988 (which shortened the working week from 48 to 44 hours).   
  5 August 1991.
11  In political terms, three events were important in the 80s: (a) in 1984, the 
minimum wage became national, after slow regional convergence; (b) with the end of the 
military regime in 1985, the 1988 Constitution re-defined the minimum basket as the minimum 
diet, accommodation, education, health, leisure, clothing, hygiene, transport, and retirement for 
an adult worker and his family - even though such a basket was unaffordable at the prevalent 
minimum wage; (c) the union movement re-emerged and became ever stronger, reaching a high 
union density for a developing country (Carneiro and Henley, 1998; Amadeo and Camargo, 
1993).  In economic terms, despite the political changes, the minimum wage was still a 
component of the centralized wage policy.  The 80s and 90s witnessed an exhausting battle 
against inflation.  Five stabilization plans between 1986 and 1994 erratically adjusted, - 
systematically decreasing - the minimum wage, depending on their indexation rules and 
inflation level.  Since then, under reasonably stable inflation, the minimum wage has not been 
explicitly used as an anti-inflation policy. 
 
3.2 IDENTIFICATION 
Within a month, the minimum wage is a constant and therefore cannot explain variations in 
prices across regions.  The real minimum wage varies across regions purely because the 
nominal minimum wage has been deflated with regional deflators.  This variation cannot be 
regarded as genuine, as it is completely driven by the variation in the deflators; the effect of the 
inverse of the deflator on employment is what is ultimately estimated (Welch and Cunningham, 
1978; Freeman, 1982).  Lacking genuine regional variation, identification relies on time 
variation, which depends on restrictions on time effects - the so-called ad hoc identification, 
predominant in the early minimum wage literature.  On the one hand, no restriction means to 
model time defining one dummy for each time period.  This provokes perfect multicollinearity 
(Brown et al., 1982; Card and Krueger, 1995; Burkhauser et al., 2000; Dolado et al., 1997; Lee, 
1999).  On the other hand, full restriction means to model time defining a linear trend.  This 
does not separate the effect of the minimum from the effect of other regional macro variables 
on employment.   
Identification requires regional variation if no restriction on time is imposed.  Many 
minimum wage variables with such a regional variation have been suggested in the literature.  
Graph 3.1b shows the typically used “Kaitz index” (Kaitz, 1970), defined as the ratio of the 
minimum wage to average wage adjusted for coverage of the legislation.  The Kaitz index 
varies across regions and over time, but the above criticism applies: once the numerator is 
constant, the effect of the inverse of the average wages on employment is what is ultimately 
estimated.  Other variables such as “fraction affected” and “spike” have also been suggested.  
Graph 3.1c shows fraction, i.e. the proportion of people earning a wage between the old and the 
new minimum wage (Card, 1992; and Card and Krueger, 1995), whose correlation with the real 
minimum wage is 0.57.  While the fraction affected was 7.4% for the US in 1990 (Card and 
Krueger, 1995), it was 8% for Brazil, although as high as 49% in PE.   
A well documented feature of the empirical wage distribution is the spike generated by the 
minimum wage (Card and Krueger, 1995; Brown, 1999).
  Graph 3.1d shows spike, i.e. the 
proportion of people earning one minimum wage (Dolado at al., 1997), whose correlation with 
                                                            
11 At that time, there were two currencies in the country:  Cruzeiros Reais and Real (URV).  Inflation was much 
higher if measured in Cruzeiros Reais, as was the idea behind the Plan.  Here, the inflation in Reais was corrected 
(by 21.99%) to account for the inflation in Cruzeiros Reais in July 1994. 
  6 the real minimum wage is 0.64.
12  Spike moves in response to the minimum wage, being bigger 
after a minimum wage increase and smaller as different categories have their salaries negotiated 
and are pulled out of the minimum wage (Card and Krueger, 1995).  This is particularly 
remarkable in high inflation periods (Carmargo, 1984) - compare the spike and the saw-toothed 
pattern of the real minimum wage, also documented by Brown (1999) for the US.  While the 
spike was 4% for the US in 1993 (Dolado, 1992), it was 12% for Brazil, although as high as 
25% in PE, a poor region.
13     
Brown (1999, p. 2130) advocates that the ‘degree of impact’ measures (e.g., fraction 
affected) are conceptually cleaner than the ‘relative minimum wage’ variable (e.g., Kaitz 
index).  He also notes that fraction affected is “not well-suited for studying periods when the 
minimum wage is constant, and so its impact should be declining.  While there is more to be 
learned from a year in which the minimum wage increases by 10 or 15% more than average 
wages than from a year of modest decline, the periods between increases should together 
contain about as much information as the periods of increase.”  In other words, fraction is 
constant at zero regardless of how unimportant the minimum wage might become.  As 
discussed thoroughly in Lemos (2002b), spike is superior to Kaitz index and fraction.  On the 
one hand spike is conceptually related to fraction and is therefore methodologically clean; on 
the other hand spike does not suffer from the same drawback, as it can be defined even when 
the minimum wage is constant.   
Once regional variation has been ensured, no restriction needs to be placed on time 
modeling.  The typical annual data model in the literature includes year and regional dummies 
to model time and regional fixed effects (Brown, 1999).  Intuitively, the month data version of 
this model would require month in place of the year dummies.  However, that would eliminate 
all the variation in the model because each dummy would capture all that affects wages in each 
month - including the discrete minimum wage increases.  As a result, there would be no 
variation but noise left to identify the minimum wage effect (Burkhauser et al., 2000).  An 
alternative is to expect a relationship between both models.  It is easy to show that the 
aggregated version of the month model is the typical annual model found in the literature - and 
therefore their parameters are related.  In this sense, the month is no worse than the annual 
model.  However, some might argue that despite the mathematical correspondence, year 
dummies alone are not sufficient to model time in a month model.  In response to that, 
seasonal-month dummies to control for unobserved fixed effects across months are included as 
in Burkhauser et al. (2000).  It is possible to include both (year and seasonal month dummies) 
because of the month-to-month (rather than the typical annual) variation in the minimum wage 
in most of the sample period in Brazil.  Also, stabilization plan dummies are included to 
capture common macro shocks under each stabilization plan.
14  All these time dummies, 
                                                            
12 From March to June 1994 the minimum wage was fixed at 64.79 URV and converted into Cruzeiros Reais on 
the day of payment.  To capture the spike, the MWt  is here converted by the average URV of the first 7 days of 
montht+1, since by law MWt must be paid at the latest on the 5
th working day of montht+1 (CLT, art. 459, law 
7855/89). 
13 Spike is here defined using real earnings as opposed to real hourly wages used in the Graphs 3.1c.  Although the 
correlation between the two is high – the regression results below are robust to either definition - the first is bigger 
at every point in time because the labour market in Brazil functions on monthly basis and because of measurement 
error when defining spike using hourly real minimum wage. 
14 Each had very particular rules (Abreu, 1992) and thus macro shocks were similar within, and different across, 
plans.   
  7 namely year, seasonal-month, and stabilization plan dummies;
15 attempt to separate out the 
effect of other regional macro variables from the effect of the minimum wage on prices.
16 
 
4. DESCRIPTIVE MODELS  
Changes in employment can be decomposed into changes in the number of jobs and 
changes in hours of work.  Let average hours in the population (T ) be equal to the product of 
average hours for those working (H ) and the employment rate ( ).  Then, assuming that each 
of these three variables is a function of the minimum wage, total employment elasticity is equal 
to the hours plus job elasticities.
17 
E
As noted by Brown et al. (1982, p. 497), “to measure the employment effect of the 
minimum wage, the ratio of employment to population is used most often as the dependent 
variable”.  However, the above decomposition suggests not only  , but also  E T and  H as 
dependent variables; as a result, three specifications for the employment equation naturally 
arise.  If a log-log or semi-log functional form is assumed, as it is common in employment 
models (Brown, 1999), and the set of regressors is the same, the additivity property of OLS 
holds and the estimate in the T model equals the sum of estimates in the H and   models. 
Although this issue has not received much attention in the literature (Barzel, 1973; Gramlich, 
1976; Linneman, 1982; Brown et al., 1982; Brown, 1999), more recent research (Michl, 2000; 
E
                                                            
15 A dummy was defined in October 1988, when the new Constitution:  (a) shortened the working week from 48 to 
44 hours; and (b) introduced an alternative working day of 6 consecutive hours instead of 8 with 2 hours break. 
16 An F test was implemented to test whether these time dummies capture the relevant month variation.  Consider 
two versions of the month model:  (1) restricted - time is modeled by year, seasonal-month, stabilization plan, and 
structural break dummies; and (2) unrestricted - time is modeled by one dummy for each time period.  Test F tests 
whether the restricted model is a good approximation of the fully saturated model; if most of the month variation is 
not being captured, the F test will fail the restricted model.  Also, a more general Wald test (where the restricted is 
nested into the unrestricted model) is proposed to account for non iid errors.  Both F and Wald tests rejected the 
restricted model; in the unrestricted model, the September dummies of each year were significant, even though a 
seasonal September dummy was included - it was the same for the January, May and November dummies of most 
years.  Also, dummies coinciding with the implementation of the stabilization plan were significant, even though 
stabilization plan dummies were included.  A hybrid model might be a compromise, adding dummies for January, 
May, September and November as well as for the month of implementation of each stabilization plan to the 
restricted model.  However, before rejecting the restricted model, a Schwarz (likelihood) test for long T and short 
N panel data should be performed; Schwarz could be bigger for the restricted model even if restrictions are 
rejected on conventional tests.  Despite these results the restricted version of the model is here reported, as the 
fully saturated model is not identified.  Note the robustness of estimates to alternative specifications.  
A similar procedure was used to test whether spike had variation over and above the time dummies to explain 
wages and employment.  Both F and Wald tests rejected the restricted model; various time dummies in the 
unrestricted model were significant.  This is reassuring that the variation captured by spike - further to that 
captured by the time dummies – is due to the minimum wage. 

















N e , where   and   are sample sizes of the employed and labour 
force and hour  is hours worked.  Re-writing this equation as a function of the minimum wage, 
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  8 Zavodny, 2000; Card and Krueger, 1999; Neumark and Wascher, 1998) suggests that non-
negative effects on jobs are sub-product of adjustments in hours.  Ultimately, the signs of the 
hour and job effects depend on the production function and hiring and firing costs.  Zavodny 
(2000) and Machin et al. (2002) estimate job and hours effects, but do not formalize it as a 
decomposition. 
Each of these three specifications was estimated for four alternative LHS data filters, to 
account for Baker et al.’s (1999) criticism:
18 Within Groups (WG), OLS on the first-difference 
(FD), twelfth difference (TD) and on both first and twelfth differences (FTD).  For each of 
these: 
(1) Raw correlations, including past inflation, were estimated.  On the one hand, the 
macroeconomic policy, including the minimum wage policy, was aimed at stabilizing the 
inflation; thus, inflation is driving other variables.  On the other hand, the minimum wage was 
used as indexer (Section 3.1); thus, past inflation captures the portion of the minimum wage 
increase that merely compensates inflation. 
(2) Regional and time dummies were included (see Section 3.2). 
(3) Population and institutional variables that control for region specific demographics 
potentially correlated with the minimum wage are included:  the proportion of workers in the 
population who are:  young, younger than 10 years old, women, illiterates, retired, students, in 
the informal sector, in urban areas, in the public sector, in the building construction industry 
sector, in the metallurgic industry sector, basic education degree holders, high school degree 
holders, and the proportion of workers with a second job.
19   
                                                            
18 Baker et al. (1999) attempt to reconcile the debate from the frequency domain approach.  The appropriate data 
filter (short or long differencing) matters because the minimum wage effect is not constant across frequencies; 
negative or positive results are found depending on whether low or high frequency data is used.  Card and Krueger 
(1995) found positive results using one and two-year-differencing (high frequency) whereas Neumark and 
Wascher (1992) found negative results using long differencing.  Baker et al. (1999) argue that such conflicting 
results are a clear sign of mis-specification. (Also see Williams and Mills, 1998). In addition, differencing reduces 
variables to stationarity preventing spurius regression.   
19 There is some agreement that demand side variables should be held constant, but less agreement on whether 
supply side variables should be included as controls and, if so, which ones.  The debate is about whether a reduced 
form or a demand equation is estimated, depending on whether the minimum wage is binding or not (Neumark and 
Wascher, 1992, 1995, 1996).  For those who earn a minimum wage, employment is demand determined, but for 
those who earn more, relative supply and demand matter.  Nevertheless, even if employment is demand 
determined, truly exogenous supply side variables do not bias the coefficient, although they do bring in 
inefficiency (Brown et al., 1982 and 1983).  Typically, employment equations in the literature have been 
interpreted as demand equations, even though many include supply side variables (Card and Krueger, 1995).    
Of particular concern is the inclusion of a variable measuring enrolment rates in school, which is jointly 
determined with - rather than an exogenous determinant of - employment, since schooling and working are 
alternative opportunities (Card and Krueger, 1995).  Neumark and Wascher (1992) report results both excluding 
(omitted variable bias) and including (simultaneity bias) enrolment rate as a strategy to bracket the true minimum 
wage effect.  Card and Krueger (1995) argue that if year and region effects are modeled, then excluding enrolment 
rate does not matter much.  As claimed by Brown (1999), if minimum wage reduces both employment and 
enrolment, reduced form and enrolment rate constant employment equations have very different interpretations.  If 
the minimum wage reduces school enrolment, this might be more important than adverse employment effects.  
In Brazil, a large number of minimum wage workers are adults no longer at school.  Also, schooling is largely 
available in the evenings, and therefore working and schooling need not be exclusive alternatives; if present, the 
simultaneity bias will not be as strong.  Due to these particularities and the unresolved debate, enrolment rate was 
not here included (Williams, 1993; Baker, 1999).  
  9 (4) and (5) Finally, dynamics were added because an increase in the minimum wage might 
not affect employment contemporaneously but may do so in future periods.  This is because the 
inability to adjust other inputs instantaneously creates lagged responses in employment (Brown, 
1982; Neumark and Wascher, 1992; Hamermesh, 1995).  Thus, dynamic models with 12 and 
24 lags were estimated, once such large T on monthly data allowed for long dynamics.
  
                                                          
By modeling regional and time fixed effects, including controls and lags, and differencing 
the data, the errors are no longer expected to be serially correlated.  Neumark and Wascher 
(1992) also assume errors to be serially uncorrelated; few authors (Brown et al., 1983; Dolado 
et al., 1997; Burkhauser, 2000; Zavodny, 2000) worry about it (Brown, 1999).  This variety of 
specifications embraces the typical specifications in the literature (Brown, 1999; Burkhauser et 
al., 1997; Card and Krueger, 1995; Neumark and Wascher, 1994; Nickell, 1986).
20 
Graph 4.1 plots log employment rate against log real minimum wage.  The suggested 
positive raw correlation in levels fades as the data is differenced; this offers no support for a 
negative effect of the minimum wage on employment - if anything, the correlation is weakly 
positive.
21  Nonetheless, such raw correlations need to be proved robust when the effect of 
other variables (demand and supply shocks) on employment is controlled for.  The 
specifications in Graph 4.2 and corresponding panel A of Table 4.A (in the appendix) begin 
with raw correlations and then add fixed effects, controls and dynamics (as discussed above).  
In line with the plots, such estimates also give little support for a negative effect:  they are 
mostly positive, statistically significant, but small.  The spike coefficient for the total 
employment model ranges from –0.036 to 0.779, decomposed into (a) the hours coefficient 
ranging from 0.173 to 0.844 (darker bars); and (b) the jobs coefficient ranging from -0.232 to 
0.202 (lighter bars).  An increase in the minimum wage sufficient to increase spike by 10 
percentage points is associated with a decrease in employment of 0.04% at the most.  Put 
differently, a 10% increase in the minimum wage in the sample period typically increases spike 
by 1%, which is associated with a decrease in total employment of 0.04% at the most.   
However, this is a correlation, rather than a behavioural elasticity, once the model is purely 
descriptive.  Thus far only descriptive models have been estimated; the next step is an attempt 
to estimate behavioural effects rather than correlations.    
 
5. ROBUSTNESS CHECK  
To sum the identification discussion:  (1) By using spike as a measure of the constant 
minimum wage, the effect of spike is not confounded with the effect of other regional macro 
variables on employment.  (2) By accounting for regional fixed effects, the effect of spike is not 
confounded with the effect of unobserved regional macro fixed effects on employment.  The 
last step is to control for simultaneity bias.  (3) By correcting for simultaneity bias, the effect of 
spike is not confounded with the effect of unobserved regional macro variables on employment.  
The nominal minimum wage is predetermined, but spike and employment are 
simultaneously determined.  Once the minimum wage is increased, the relative wage bargains 
 
20 The errors are sample size weighted and White corrected.  Heteroskedasticity arises from the aggregation per 
region because averages computed over a larger sample size have smaller variance.  Incidentally, weighting 
captures the relative importance of each region to the (regional weighted) average coefficient if the sample size is 
proportional to the regional labour market (Card and Krueger 1995; Neumark and Wascher 1992; Baker at all. 
1999).  Note that PME is sometimes weighted by projections of population size. 
21 The plot of log hours worked against log real minimum wage follows a similar pattern. 
  10determine the workers’ position in the wages distribution; this also determines who earns one 
minimum wage, i.e. who is at the spike.
22  An exogenous or predetermined variable - that 
affects employment only via spike - is necessary to ensure identification.  Lags of spike and 
political variables are proposed as such an instrumental variable. 
The specifications of Section 4 are then instrumented.  If the errors are assumed serially 
uncorrelated, lags of spike, naturally correlated with spike but uncorrelated with the error term, 
fulfill the properties of a valid instrument.  Panel B of Table 4.A shows estimates, not always 
significant, of magnitude and signs not too different from the uninstrumented versions of 
Section 4.  The total employment elasticity ranges from -0.327 to 0.956, decomposed into (a) 
hours elasticity, ranging from -0.158 to 0.975; and (b) jobs elasticity, ranging from -0.306 to 
0.312.  Other things constant, increasing the minimum wage by 10% (increases spike by 1%) 
decreases employment by 0.3% at the most.  
 
5.1 SERIAL CORRELATION  
If serial correlation is relaxed, the structure of the errors is crucial in defining which - if 
any - lag of the endogenous variable can be used as a valid instrument.  Assuming serial 
correlation due to mis-specified dependent variable dynamics, as its lags are included as 
regressors, serial correlation is expected to vanish.  In this sense, the Sargan test can be used as 
a model selection criterion, indicating which dynamics generate serially uncorrelated errors and 
validates lags (of the endogenous variable) as instruments (Andrews, 1999; Szroeter, 2000).  
Ultimately, an orthogonality condition must be made to produce an estimable equation and it is 
not too unrealistic to assume that serial correlation will vanish after differencing, adding 
dynamics, controls, regional and time dummies.  
This was the idea in Section 5.  Table 5.A (in the Appendix) shows the associated 
overidentifying restrictions (Sargan) test, Hausman test and F test (in the first step of the 2SLS) 
for the models in Table 4.A.  The Hausman test shows endogeneity, as anticipated in Section 
3.3, the F test shows the instruments performed well, but the Sargan test fails even in the 
dynamic models – this invalidates lags of spike as instruments.
23  Only an excluded instrument 
with truly exogenous variation, uncorrelated with the error term and all its past lags, will ensure 
consistency.  Political variables were used in an attempt to define such an instrument. 
 
5.2 EXCLUDED EXOGENEOUS INSTRUMENTS 
Three different sources of political variables are used as instruments (see Appendix A 
and Table 5.1 for institutional details and correlations): 
Politicians Data - It is well established in the politics of the minimum wage literature that 
politicians might favor or oppose minimum wage increases depending on the overall 
                                                            
22 The nominal minimum wage might be endogeneous if its increases are related to regional macroeconomic 
performance (Card and Krueger, 1995; Dolato et al., 1997; William and Mills, 1998).  Further endogeneity can be 
caused by the denominator of the real minimum wage, i.e. price or (average) wage deflators (Dolado et al, 1997; 
Zavodny, 2000).  The most obvious instruments for spike are lagged real minimum wage and lagged Kaitz index 
along with lagged spike.  However, (a) they do not ensure identification, as discussed in Section 3.2; and (b) they 
suffer from the same drawback as spike when serial correlation is relaxed (see Section 5.1).  Despite of that, 
robustness checks using such instruments produced robust estimates.   
23 Tentative explanations for persistent serial correlation are: month dynamics modeling, “indexation serial 
correlation memory”, and omitted independent variable dynamics. 
  11macroeconomic performance in each region.  The final increase is a regional weighted average; 
the impact of the increase in each region determines the political support (the relative weight) 
of that region to the increase – which ultimately determines spike.  In Brazil, the Intersyndical 
Department of Parliamentary Consultancy (DIAP) attributes marks to politicians for each vote 
favoring workers in workers related bills and ranks the most influential congressmen.  The 
more such congressmen from a particular region, the more weight on the interests (group 
interests) of that region.  Put differently, the more pro-increase (contra-increase) influential 
congressmen, the higher (lower) the minimum wage.  These are personal characteristics and 
there is no reason to believe they are endogeneously determined with employment.   
Voting Data - Some might argue that voting data would measure the regional weight more 
directly associated with minimum wage increases.  Card and Krueger (1995) used voting data 
to construct a measure of political support.  Similar data was collected for Brazil from the 
National Congress Daily (Diario do Congresso Nacional, DCN).  As an attempt to further 
measure the political bargaining process, data was collected on bills never submitted to voting, 
on the commissions formed to appreciate bills, and on the speeches of congressmen.  As 
discussed in Section 5, minimum wage increases are here assumed predetermined - and so must 
be the underlying voting.  Those who regard the potential correlation with past information as a 
source of endogeneity can regard this as a robustness check where the “more endogeneous” 
spike is exchanged by the “less endogeneous” instrument.  Whereas these instruments might be 
contaminated with some endogeneity, this is negligible in the next set of instruments, once 
elections only happen every 4 years, and it is certainly not the case in the previous set of 
instrument.  An interesting feature of voting data is that voting can be non-secret (nominal), 
secret, or party oriented.  During the dictatorship there was no voting, and when there was, it 
was symbolic - this is an exogeneous instrument in itself.     
Election Data - However, regional affordability is not the only criterion for political 
support.  As an attempt to collect data with independent variation to further test the robustness 
of the estimates, consider political propaganda.  First assume that incentives for more generous 
increases depend on the proximity of elections; the closer the elections, the higher the 
minimum wage.  Further, assume that left-wing politicians are in favor of more generous 
increases.  The lower the minimum wage, the more dissatisfied people, and the more left-wing 
politicians elected.  Data on the number (proportion) of votes for left-wing candidates and on 
the political cycle was used as instruments.   
The full set of results for the above groups of instruments is reported in the corresponding 
panels of Table 4.A.  The estimates are still clustered around zero but larger than before in 
absolute terms.  Estimates are both smaller and more significant in panels C to E and larger 
when interaction instruments were used in the base specification in panels F to J, but are not 
always significant.  Table 5.2 shows that the total employment elasticity ranges from -2.50 to 
4.01, decomposed into (a) hours elasticity, ranging from -2.24 to 3.49; and (b) jobs elasticity, 
ranging from -2.59 to 1.71.  Holding other things constant, increasing the minimum wage by 
10% (increases spike by 1%) decreases employment by 2.6% at the most.  Table 5.2 presents 
the interval that brackets the effect of a 10% increase in the minimum wage across models and 
variables.  Finally, the last two columns of Table 4.A also show a less than 2.5% employment 
decrease in the long run.     
  A preferred specification is not chosen; instead, the range of estimates produced is 
expected to embrace the true coefficient.  If a preferred specification was to be chosen, it would 
  12be the more complete specifications (including fixed and regional effects, controls and 
dynamics
24) in first differences (FD and TFD), instrumented with raw political variables - i.e., 
columns 4 and 5, rows FD and TD, of panels C to E.  These models are expected to produce 
errors serially uncorrelated, but even if they do not, the political instruments ensure consistency 
through the less debatable set of (non-interacted) instruments.  Specifications in panels D and E 
perform better in the overall tests:  (1) These specifications produce the most robust estimates; 
(2) Some endogeneity could not be rejected according to the Hausman test, as above; (3) the 
Sargan test did not fail in FD and TD for dynamic models, as expected; and (4) the F test 
showed the fairly high explanatory power of the instruments.  Thus, these specifications are 
more reliable both conceptually and statistically.  Incidentally this “preferred” specification - 
narrowing down to the elite instruments in panel D, row FD, column 5 - produces estimates 
fairly similar to the other specifications.  That is, ultimately, the argument for not choosing a 
preferred specification.   
Bracketing the employment elasticity below 3% across such a variety of models is 
reassuring; considering estimates from the preferred specification only, this number goes down 
to 0.3%, the same figure found in Sections 4 and 5 above - which is even more reassuring.  
These results were fairly robust to changes in the specification and to various alternative 
instruments.  There is always room for criticisms on instruments, which are always very hard to 
find in economics.  These were aimed only at checking the robustness of the results.  Indeed, 
whatever the specification, the results are pretty much the same.  They are also in line with the 
international and Brazilian literature; Camargo (1984), Velloso (1988), Neri (1997), Foguel 
(1997), Carneiro (2000) and Lemos (2002), among others, also found small (non-significant) 
adverse employment effects for Brazil.   
All the above pieces of evidence suggest that an increase in the minimum wage does not 
always have a significant effect on employment and it is not always negative; a cautious 
reading is that the minimum wage has small adverse effects on employment.  Regarding the 
above as demand equations, this is consistent with a fairly inelastic demand curve:  minimum 
wage increases translate into small employment losses (Freeman, 1995).
25     
 
6. FURTHER ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
6.1 FORMAL AND INFORMAL SECTORS 
Assuming (a) no sorting by wages into formal and informal sectors (random assignment); 
and (b) full compliance with the same minimum wage law in both sectors; the wage 
distributions would look identical and the effects of the minimum wage on wages would be the 
same in both sectors; i.e., the null   should not be rejected.  Further assuming (c) 
the same labour demand elasticity in both sectors, the effects of the minimum wage on 
employment would be the same in both sectors.   
I F β β β= =
If any of these assumptions is relaxed, the effect of the minimum wage could differ across 
sectors.  First, if individuals with particular characteristics sort themselves into one or another 
sector, as not all such characteristics are observed, correlation between the observables and 
                                                            
24 As employment is expected to be AR(2) using annual data (Layard et al., 1991), then the dynamic specification 
including 24 lags of employment using monthly data is more reliable.   
25 Barros et al. (2002) also estimated a fairly inelastic labour demand for the industry sector in Brazil using panel 
data techniques; the elasticities vary across specifications from 0.0 to –0.3. 
  13unobservables could contaminate the coefficients with endogeneity bias.   Even though the 
underlying coefficients could still be the same, the null hypothesis of equal coefficients could 
be incorrectly rejected because of the bias.
26  Second, even if there is no sorting, compliance 
with the law might only take place in the formal sector.  Third, even in presence of no sorting 
and full compliance in both sectors, the employment response to the minimum wage might 
differ if the labour demand elasticities are relatively different across sectors. 
The standard Welch-Gramlich-Mincer Two Sector Model major prediction is that the 
uncovered sector wages fall as a result of formal sector displaced workers moving into informal 
sector employment.  It follows that a spike should not be observed in the uncovered sector 
wage distribution (Brown, 1999; Card and Krueger, 1995; Welch, 1976; Gramlich, 1976; 
Mincer, 1976).  If additionally labour supply is assumed inelastic, the uncovered sector 
employment increase is just enough to off set the formal sector employment decrease 
( ) and the net (full sample) employment effect is zero.
27  In this case, it is important 
to investigate the covered and uncovered sector coefficients underlying the net coefficient - 
especially if the uncovered sector is large. 
I F β β− =
The predictions of the Two Sectors Model follow from the assumption of non-coverage.  
The Brazilian informal market suffers from non-compliance not non-coverage.  That is the key 
difference between the US literature on the effects of the minimum wage in the uncovered 
sector and the Brazilian literature on the effects of the minimum wage in the informal sector.  
Informal sector wages and employment need not and will not respond to an increase in the 
minimum wage in the same way uncovered sector wages and employment respond.   
Graph 6.1I (and corresponding panels 1 and 2 of Table 6.A in the Appendix) presents 
estimates of the coefficients of the employment effect by sector using the preferred 
specification (as argued in Section 5.2.4).
28  The pattern of signs, significance, and magnitudes 
are remarkably similar in both sectors.
29  The null hypothesis of identical employment effects 
could not be rejected across 30 specifications (except one, where the estimates are not 
significant individually; incidentally, the most incomplete specification).
30 
                                                            
26 An ingenious method to prevent this, where an excluded exogenous instrument is not crucial, is aggregation by 
cohort as in Meghir and Whitehouse (1996), Blundell, et al. (1998), Angrist (1991), Browning et al. (1985), 
Deaton (1985), and Attanazio and Browning (1985).  
27 Incidentally, this might offer an explanation for the clustered around zero net employment effect found in the 
literature if the labour supply is relatively inelastic; Brown (1999), however, finds rather implausible the 
associated large fall in the informal sector wages.   
28 These are to be compared with the estimates in columns 4 and 5, rows FD and TD, of panel A in Table 4.A.   
29 Because the full sample employment rate (hours worked) is equal to the sum of the formal and informal sectors 
employment rate (hours worked), the OLS additivity guarantees that β .  However, for consistency 
throughout the paper, here also the models were specified in logs to guarantee that   (see Section IV.1).  
Because the log of full sample employment rate (hours worked) is no longer equal to the sum of the log of formal 
and informal sectors employment rate (hours worked), β  no longer holds.  This is a technical issue that has 
no further implications; the functional form does not change the estimates magnitudes significantly, and it does not 
change their signs at all.  Also note that, in line with previous work for Brazil (Menezes-Filho et al., 2002; 
Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto, 2002; Carneiro and Henley, 2002), the self-employed were dropped because the design 
of the survey does not allow their classification into formal or informal sector workers.   
I F β β + =
E H T β β β + =
I F β β + =
30 Sorting, compliance, and labour demand elasticities, as discussed above, do not seem to be a matter of concern.  
(1) There might be some endogeneity, but not enough to contaminate the results as to reject the null.  (2) There 
might be some non-compliance, but on other aspects of the labour contract, such as social security taxes, paid 
holidays, health insurance, etc. (Amadeo et al., 1995); the presence of a spike in both sectors (Lemos, 2002) 
  14These results are not surprising and are rather reassuring of other features of the data.  
First, a large spike is observed in the earnings distribution of both sectors, as documented by 
Lemos (2002), Neri (1997) and Foguel (1997) for Brazil.  Card and Krueger (1995) and Brown 
(1999) also document a spike in the uncovered sector for the US.  If the minimum wage is 
binding in both sectors, employment should decrease in both sectors.  Second, spillover effects 
in both sectors - more robust for the informal sector, the so-called “Efeito Farol” (see Section 
3.1) – was reported by Lemos (2002), Neri (1997), Foguel (1997), Neri et al. (1999) and 
Carneiro (2000) for Brazil, even though Velloso’s (1988) inconclusive and Carneiro’s (2000) 
positive informal employment effect is at odds with the “Efeito Farol”.  If wages increase in 
both sectors, employment should decrease in both sectors.  Mincer (1976) note that the 
prediction of uncovered sector wages fall is not robust to alternative assumptions on sectoral 
choice and unemployment; Card and Krueger (1995) show that the uncovered sector wages rise 
(and employment falls) if the covered sector labour demand is relatively inelastic.
31   
Thus, the presence of a spike and spillover effects in both sectors is consistent with the 
negative employment effects found in both sectors (see Graph 6.1Ic).  This is also consistent 
with the positive unemployment effects documented in Graph 6.1Id and in line with findings 
for Brazil by Lemos (2002), Foguel (1997), Neri (1997), and Neri et al. (1999).  This is 
reassuring of the net (full sample) employment effects from Section 5.  The robustness checks 
for the formal and informal sectors therefore are not sufficiently strong to change the previous 
conclusions.     
 
6.2 PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS 
The employment effects predicted by the neoclassical model relies on a profit maximizing 
firm, not on a government employer that can cover the higher wage bill by raising taxes, 
reducing expenditure, or simply printing money, as in Brazil (see Section 3.1).  This is not to 
claim there will be no adverse employment effect in the public sector; even though they are not 
predicted by an specific theory, Hamermesh (1993) notes that institutional differences in 
developing countries do not require changes in the basic theory of labour demand.   
However, because evidence regarding the private sector need not carry over to the public 
sector, the same sort of robustness check carried out for the formal and informal sectors in 
Section 6.1 is performed for the private and public sectors.  Investigating the public sector 
employment effects is particularly relevant if the public sector, as in Brazil, is overpopulated by 
minimum wage workers and has no negligible spillover effects (Lemos, 2002).  
Graph 6.1II (and corresponding panels 3 and 4 of Table 6.A in the Appendix) presents the 
estimates.  Once again the pattern of signs and magnitudes are similar in both sectors, even 
though the public sector estimates are not as robust.  The null hypothesis of identical 
                                                                                                                                                                             
suggests that the effective pay (the minimum wage) taken home is the same in both sectors.  Further non-
compliance - workers earning below the minimum wage - is present, but even there spillover effects are 
documented (Lemos, 2002).  The presence of spike is evidence against non-compliance in the sense of absence of 
minimum wage workers.  Reis (1989) reports that non-compliance in Brazil is higher among the women, the less 
educated, the youngsters, in the service sectors, and in the poorest regions.  See Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) and 
Card and Krueger (1995) for non-compliance.  (3) The labour demand elasticities might differ across sectors, but 
not as much as to drive the null to be rejected. 
31 The labour demand for the industry (mainly formal sector firms) in Brazil is fairly inelastic (Barros et al., 2002); 
no estimates of the informal sector labour demand elasticity was found to be available for Brazil. 
  15employment effects could not be rejected across 30 specifications (admittedly, in a few cases, 
this might be due to large standard errors).  Nevertheless, once again, the robustness checks for 
the private and public sectors are not sufficiently strong to change the previous conclusions.  
This is in line with findings by Lemos (2002). 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper contributes to the existing (mainly US) literature by estimating the minimum 
wage effects on employment for a key non-US example.  Brazil’s minimum wage policy is a 
distinctive and central feature of the Brazilian economy.  Not only are increases in the 
minimum wage large and frequent, but also the minimum wage has been used as anti-inflation 
policy in addition to its social role.  It affects employment directly and indirectly, through 
wages, pensions, benefits, inflation, the informal sector, and the public deficit.  This confirms 
the importance of studying the minimum wage in Brazil.     
This paper also contributes to the literature by discussing a number of conceptual and 
identification questions as tentative explanation of the non-negative employment effects 
recently found in the literature.  This effect was exhaustively measured using a variety of 
specifications, instruments, and estimation techniques. 
Evidence of a moderately small adverse effect was uncovered and shown to be robust to 
many specification changes and tests.  This small effect, clustered around zero, is in line with 
more recent international and Brazilian empirical literature.  
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APPENDIX A – DEFINING EXCLUDED EXOGENEOUS INSTRUMENTS 
A.1 Politicians Data 
As discussed in Section 3.3, the intuition for the “degree of impact” variables is that a 
national minimum wage increase affects a different proportion of people across regions 
depending on the overall macroeconomic performance in each region.  Similarly, the intuition 
for the political variable instrument is that the underlying political bargaining process for the 
increase implicitly accounts for the overall macroeconomic performance in each region.  Card 
and Krueger (1995, p. 134) argue that “Politicians from states in which an increase in the 
minimum wage is expected to have a strong effect on wages or employment opportunities 
might oppose the increase, whereas those from states in which the expected effect is smaller 
  19might support it.”  In Brazil, not only the direct, but also the indirect effect on employment via 
wages, pensions, benefits, inflation, informal sector, and the public deficit is on politicians’ 
minds.  The final increase is a regional weighted average.  Becker (1983) argues that policy is 
the result of compromise between competing interest groups (regions); what matters is their 
relative strength.  The impact of the increase in each region determines the political support 
(the relative weight) of that region to the increase – which ultimately determines spike.  Thus, 
political support and spike are correlated.
32     
In Brazil, the Intersyndical Department of Parliamentary Consultancy (DIAP) ranks the 
100 most influential congressmen in the country according to political science criterion 
(debating, negotiating, voting, articulating, forming opinion, leading, etc.) which enables them 
to have their ideas and beliefs prevalent in the bargaining process (DIAP, 2001).  These are 
personal characteristics and there is no reason to believe they are endogeneously determined 
with employment.  The more such congressmen from a particular region, the more weight on 
the interests (group interests) of that region.  Sobel (1999) argues that interest group pressure 
significantly influenced congressional voting on the passage of the minimum wage bills in the 
US.
33  DIAP’s rank is then a measure of regional weight and was here defined as an instrument 
(IV1).  The more pro-increase (contra-increase) influential congressmen, the higher (lower) the 
minimum wage.  This can drive the correlation with real minimum wage to be either positive or 
negative, depending on the political context.  However, Table 5.1 shows a strong positive 
correlation (0.62), which suggests a fairly stable correlation over the sample period.
34  DIAP’s 
rank was also re-defined as a proportion of congressmen from the sampled regions (BA, PE, 
MG, RJ, SP and RS), which did not change the sign of the correlations (IV2). 
DIAP also attributes marks to politicians for each vote favouring workers in workers 
related bills.  The following, due to specificities of the socio-economic-political process in 
Brazil, were selected by DIAP as such bills: wage, pension and benefits increases; land reform; 
permanent tenure of civil servants; union leader permanent tenure; subsoil nationalization; 
unfair dismissal; petroleum state monopoly; non-reductible wages; presidencialism and 
republic as a systems of government; temporary redundancy; work week shortening; 
centralized union organization; 30 days minimum notice; centralized union organization; 
conditions of retirement; paid holidays; maternity leave; workers representative to company 
management; progressive tax bands; central bank independence; Christmas bonus; direct 
presidential elections; president mandate length; striking rights; political administrative reform; 
new constitution; voluntary union contribution; president re-election; presidential decrees re-
edition; redundancy and dismissals legal process subject to union check; secret vote; public and 
                                                            
32 Assume two regions only in the country:  a poor one, where spike is positive and large; and a rich one, where 
spike is zero.  If the poor region’s proposed increase has the majority of votes when voting the national bill, the 
weight on the rich region’s increase is zero and the final increase is determined by what the poor region can afford.  
In practice, the weights are somewhere between 0 and 1.   
33 Sobel (1999) rejects the hypothesis that the minimum wage policy in the US has been driven to achieve what he 
calls its “most popularly stated goals” (i.e. lifting the family of a typical minimum wage worker out of poverty, 
and maximizing her/his earnings).  He argues that an interest group model best explains the historic path of the 
minimum wage; he shows that union membership and the top marginal corporate income tax rate, as measures of 
the political power of labour and business, are correlated with the minimum wage. 
34 It is intuitively easier to discuss the sign of the correlation in relation to the real minimum wage even though 
these are instruments for spike.  Both correlations should bare the same sign, once spike and real minimum wage 
are themselves positively correlated (see Section 3.3); there are very few cases (indicated in the text) where this is 
not verified empirically.    
  20free high education; private and public health insurance and pension schemes, etc. 
35  A number 
of these are clearly not endogeneously determined with employment; this should dilute the 
endogeneity of those which are.  In other words, a considerable part of the variation is not 
simultaneously determined with employment.  A version of this instrument including solely the 
marks for bills not simultaneously determined with employment was defined; the estimates 
were robust to either definition.  The average mark for each region is a measure of how pro-
workers (pro-increase) that region is (IV3); the higher the mark, the higher the minimum wage.  
Table 5.1 confirms a strong positive correlation with the real minimum wage, but not with 
spike.
36   
The above instruments (see Panel I of Table 5.1) are strongly correlated with spike but not 
thought to be simultaneously determined with employment.  Incidentally, the Sargan test did 
not fail the specifications using such instruments (see Table 5.A).   
 
A.2 Voting Data 
Some might argue that voting data would measure the regional weight more directly 
associated with minimum wage increases.  Card and Krueger (1995) used voting data to 
construct a measure of political support.  Similar data was collected for Brazil from the 
National Congress Daily (Diario do Congresso Nacional, DCN).
37  The number of congressmen 
votes in favour (IV8 and IV9), against (IV10 and IV11) and absent (IV12 and IV13) in each 
minimum wage bill during the sample period were collected in both the Federal Senate and the 
Deputy Chamber.  Usually, pressure against the bill (pressure for no increase or a smaller 
increase) results in inflation erosion of the real minimum wage (Sobel, 1999).  In Brazil, there 
are two distinct reasons to oppose the increase.  In line with the above, pressure against the 
increase might mean that the increase cannot be afforded; this argument is usually related to the 
inflation impact or public deficit impact of the increase (see Section 3.1).  In contrast, pressure 
against the increase might mean that the increase is not large enough to even maintain the 
minimum wage purchase power; this argument is usually related to protecting the worker’s 
standard of living.  Examples of both arguments can be found in the newspapers: 
“The Government makes the minimum wage increase conditional upon the inflation level, the benefits and 
pension bill, the Estates and Cities finances…  Most Congressmen know that a big increase would put at risk 
the economic stability of the country.” (Estadao, 15
th Januray, 1998). 
“The minimum wage increase affected inflation… but the time is long gone when the increase would spread 
through the whole Economy, like the petrol increase” (Estadao, 13
th May, 2000). 
“…congressmen are worried about finding the resources to afford the bill at the federal level, but have 
forgotten the municipal level… increasing the minimum wage to R$200 would increase the wage bill of most 
small and medium towns of the Northeast by 7.8%, where 60% to 70% of civil servants receive one 
minimum wage… if they do not find resources at a municipal level, mayors will have to fire civil servants” 
(Estadao, 11
th December, 2001). 
                                                            
35 For a full and detailed list, see DIAP (1986, 1990, 1994, 2002.  These publications are not part of a series; they 
have slightly different methodologies (some adjustment had to be made).  But the main idea is the same – grading 
politicians on how worker sympathetic they are. 
36Dummies were also defined for whether these politicians are left or right wing, whether or not they hold a 
degree, and the number of mandates they hold (IV4 to IV6), which were then interacted (IV7). 
37 Minimum wage increase laws are published in the Official National Daily (Diario Oficial da Uniao, DOU), 
which indicates the associated DCN, where the debate and final votes are published.  
  21“…to buy the same basket as in 1940, when it was introduced, the minimum wage would have to be 
R$517.55 [as opposed to the current R$130]” (Estadao, 10
th May, 1998). 
The underlying reason for being against the increase will depend on the political and 
economic context, party affiliation and workers’ bargaining power, which naturally vary over 
time.  As discussed in Section 3.1, the centralized wage policy was designed to control inflation 
and the public deficit via minimum wage increases; Graph 3.1 shows supporting evidence of 
the resulting steady decrease.  It is hard to think that being against these increases is being in 
favour of even smaller increases; it is more plausible to think that opposing such a policy meant 
favouring protection of the worker’s living standard.  Thus, the more congressmen against the 
increase, the more pressure for a bigger increase, and the higher the minimum wage.  Absence 
(not justifiable absence through sickness, official mission, etc.) is also important because it 
might be a strategy against the passage of the bill (see below).  Table 5.1 shows strong negative 
correlations, although a positive sign was expected for IV10 and IV11.  This is either because 
of the underlying reason for opposing the increase, which can effectively drive the correlation 
to be negative or positive; or because of the definition of the instrument as “number” rather 
than “proportion”.  The number of congressmen both in favour and against the increase can 
move in the same direction as the minimum wage, but the proportions are not expected to.  
Thus, proportions were defined (IV14 to IV17), but the sign did not change.  Although IV15 
and IV16 bare a negative sign, the correlations are robust across definitions and variables – 
they cannot have happened by chance alone.  Most importantly, there is plausible economic 
reasoning for either a positive or a negative correlation.  Provided the correlation is reliable – 
nonzero and stable over time - it suffices to establish a robust correlation.   
There is no reason to believe that at the time politicians are voting the bill this is having a 
simultaneous effect on employment.  Card and Krueger (1995, p. 135), however, used their 
political variable as a “proxy for otherwise unobservable factors in a state that might be related 
to the impact of the law”, implicitly assuming a direct effect on employment over and above 
the indirect minimum wage effect.  As discussed in Section 5, minimum wage increases are 
here assumed predetermined - and so must be the underlying voting.  Those who regard the 
potential correlation with past information as a source of endogeneity should also regard this as 
a robustness check where the “more endogeneous” spike is exchanged by the “less 
endogeneous” instrument.  Whereas the above instruments might be contaminated with some 
endogeneity, this is negligible in the next set of instruments (Section 5.2.3), once elections only 
happen every 4 years, and it is certainly not the case in the previous set of instrument (Section 
5.2.1).     
An interesting feature is that voting can be non-secret (nominal), secret, or party oriented.  
During the dictatorship there was no voting, and when there was, it was symbolic - this is an 
exogeneous instrument in itself.  Parties orient the vote prior to voting; non-secret votes (only 
on demand) are usually a strategy of those opposing the increase (favouring a bigger increase) 
to expose their opponents.  For example: 
“The popular movement against the minimum wage of R$151 toughens up in Brasilia on Easter, when a 
circus tent will be installed in front of the Congress to shelter 1,000 retired workers who will camp there until 
voting on the bill on the 26
th.  The vigil will include a mass for the “conversion” of deputiess and senators in 
favour of a more generous minimum wage…  The organizers of the movement [the Labour Party] want to 
install panels with the names of the Congressmen and their intentions of votes in Rio and Sao Paulo… as 
well as large screens for the people to watch the voting live” (Estadao, 19
th April, 2000). 
“In a convoluted session stretching until early morning, the Government got the Congress to approve the 
R$151 minimum wage… after 3 months of fighting and thanks to a full day of intense lobbying.  The 
  22session, due to start at 7pm, was postponed to 8pm, to prevent voting going live on television, exposing the 
‘situation’ Congressmen [those in favour of the R$151 Government proposal] …who did not succeed in 
making a deal for symbolic voting, which guarantees the anonymity of votes.  The opposition 
Congressmen… insisted on nominal voting”. (Estadao, 11
th May, 2000).  “By determination of the 
president… the general secretary will list the names of the Congressmen who will be punished for voting 
against the Government.” (Estadao, 12
th May, 2000).   
“The increasing tension between allies and adversaries of the Government because of the difficulties in 
finding a solution to the minimum wage increase might stop the voting… the leader of the Labour Party… 
announced yesterday that his party will be absent”  (Estadao, 9
th November, 2000). 
The lower the minimum wage, the more pressure for a bigger increase, and the more often 
non-secret votes are demanded.  Thus, a dummy (3 for non-secret, 2 for party oriented and 1 for 
secret/symbolic vote) was defined for the Federal Senate and Deputy Chamber (IV18 and 
IV19) to account for a) data reliability, b) pressure strategies, and c) democracy level.  Table 
5.1 shows strong correlations and the expected negative sign.  Block (1980 and 1989) and Card 
and Krueger (1995) discuss party influence on the passage of minimum wage bills in the US.  
Weighting the number and proportion of votes by the voting dummy is a natural step (IV20 to 
IV29).  This places more weight on the more reliable non-secret votes data as well as on more 
proactive pro-increase and democratic times.  Table 5.1 shows strong negative correlations.  
Incidentally, this interaction dilutes the potential endogeneity discussed above, as it introduces 
exogeneous variation in the instrument definition. 
Another way to measure the political bargaining process is to consider the frequency of 
increases.  An increase occurred whenever the socio-economic-political tension for it became 
unbearable (81/217 months); tension in the month immediately after the increase is low, 
reaching its peak the month before the next increase.  The timing of the increases was regarded 
as a measure of tension and used to define a “voting cycle” variable (IV30).
38  The more often 
bills are needed, the lower the minimum wage (the faster was its inflation erosion).  Table 5.1 
shows strong correlations and the expected positive sign.  The voting cycle is assumed to be 
predetermined, as tension at each moment is a function of past information;
39 therefore, some 
might argue that this instrument suffers from the same drawback as voting data discussed 
above.  
Weighting the voting data by the voting cycle generates a political variable that measures 
regional political support over time (IV35 to IV50).  This places more weight on voting when it 
is most relevant (has just occurred), and less weight when the tension is such that new voting is 
imminent.  Weighting is also expected to improve the instruments performance - it produces 
variation across regions and over time - although Table 5.1 shows the correlations to be again 
strong and negative, but not stronger.       
The above instruments (see Panel II of Table 5.1) are strongly correlated to spike but not 
thought to be endogeneously determined with employment.  Furthermore, the Sargan test - here 
regarded as a serial correlation test - did not fail the specifications using such instruments (see 
Table 5.A).  This is supportive of the assumption that any correlation with past information is 
not too strong. 
                                                            
38 Tension can only be measured when it reaches its peak triggering an increase.  Assuming that tension grows 
linearly, the voting cycle was defined as a linear (exponential, squared, squared root and log were also 
experimented, IV31 to IV34) time trend between each of the two increases.   
39Because the voting cycle was defined as a trend between each of the two increases, some might argue that this 
introduces some kind of “future endogeneity” in the model - agents would have accurate predictions of when 
tension broke into an increase.  However, such peaks were unknown at the time, and are ex-post observed.   
  23As an attempt to further measure the political bargaining process, data was collected on 
bills never submitted to voting, on the commissions formed to appreciate bills, and on the 
speeches of congressmen.  Data on bills submitted by congressmen from the sampled regions to 
the Federal Senate and the Deputy Chamber was collected:  the number of minimum wage bills 
(IV51), by left-wing
40 congressmen (IV52), and the number of minimum wage increase bills 
(IV53).  The more bills needed, the lower the minimum wage.  Table 5.1 shows strong negative 
correlations, as expected.  For the same reasons as before, the last two instruments were defined 
as proportions of the first one (IV54 and IV55), which again did not change the sign of the 
correlation.  Also, a dummy was defined for whether the bill was or was not effective (never 
voted) (IV56).  The more effective the bills, the higher (less inflation eroded) the minimum 
wage.  Table 5.1 confirms the expected positive correlation.  Two more variables were defined 
to measure the length of the passage of the bill: a) sum of days (if more than one bill per 
month) (IV57), and b) average days (IV58).  The longer the passage, the more pressure (the 
less bargaining power), the higher (lower) the minimum wage.  The correlation sign will 
depend on the underlying reason for the delay, but it should be the same for both spike and real 
minimum wage.  Table 5.1 shows that the signs differ.  This is either because of no genuine 
correlation (indeed the correlations are low) or because of measurement error.  Regarding the 
latter, this data was collected from the National Congress System Information (SICON) on the 
internet, and (a subsample) checked against data from the Section for Parliamentary 
Information (SEDOP) in the National Congress.  The data is assumed to be reliable and 
measurement error negligible (IV51 to IV53 show strong correlations).
41 
Data was also collected on the number of speeches by congressmen from the sampled 
regions in both the Federal Senate and the Deputy Chamber regarding the minimum wage 
(IV62), by left-wing congressmen (IV63), regarding a minimum wage increase (IV64), in 
favour (IV65) and against the increase (IV66).  The more speeches needed, the lower the 
minimum wage.  Table 5.1 confirms the expected negative correlations.  This data was 
collected from the Shorthand Notes from the National Congress Sessions (and associated 
DCN); it is assumed to be reliable and the measurement error negligible for the first three, but 
not for the last two instruments.  This is because the last two are subject to interpretation, 
aggravated by the complex socio-economic-political Brazilian context and by the number of 
variables affected by the minimum wage.  Once more the last four instruments were defined as 
proportions of the first (IV67-IV70), and once more the sign of the correlation remained 
unchanged. 
For most of the bills submitted, a commission would appreciate the impact of the increase 
prior to voting.  Data on the (total, left and right-wing) number of congressmen from the 
sampled regions in each commission was collected (IV71 to IV73).  The more congressmen in 
favour of the increase, the lower the minimum wage, as before.  Table 5.1 shows negative 
correlations, even though a positive sign was expected for IV73, as before.  Once more, 
proportions were defined (IV74 to IV77), which did not change the sign of the correlations with 
real minimum wage, but turned into positive the correlations with spike.  As before, this is 
either because of no genuine correlation (indeed correlations are low) or because of 
measurement error.  Regarding the latter, this data was collected from the SICON, and checked 
against the SEDOP, as before, and is assumed to be reliable.  However, measurement error is 
                                                            
40 Left wing designation according to Figueiredo and Linomgi (1995). 
41Also, the number of bills was weighted by the “effectiveness” (IV59) and “length” dummies (IV60 and IV61).  
  24not assumed to be negligible, because of the nature of the data (there was not always a 
commission, not always a minimum wage one, etc.).  Even though these instruments were 
thought to capture the true underlying political bargaining process, not much confidence should 
be placed in them.   
As before, the instruments defined for bills, speeches and commissions (see Panel II of 
Table 5.1) are correlated to spike but not thought to be endogeneously determined with 
employment.  If there is no reason to believe that at the time politicians are voting the bill this 
has an effect on employment, then neither is there reason to believe that the underlying - and 
prior - political bargaining process does (also see Table 5.A).  Furthermore, the Sargan test - 
here regarded as a serial correlation test – again did not fail the specifications using such 
instruments (see Table 5.A).  As before, this is supportive of the assumption that any 
correlation with past information is not too strong. 
 
A.3 Election Data 
However, regional affordability is not the only criterion for political support.  As an 
attempt to collect data with independent variation to further test the robustness of the estimates, 
consider political propaganda:   
“…around 500 mayors will meet in Brasilia to discuss a strategy to pressure the Congress against … the 
minimum wage increase... [they] changed their strategy of pressure... mainly due to the proximity of the 
election campaing for the re-election of the congressmen, who dispute the support of the mayors in their 
electoral basis.” (Estadao, 11
th December, 2001). 
“Usually, the minimum wage increase is defined… in December, but this year the elections anticipated the 
debate…  the Government strategy is to postpone the increase above inflation until after October, when the 
new president will have been elected.” (Estadao, 10
th July, 2002). 
 
First assume that incentives for more generous increases depend on the proximity of 
elections.  Sobel (1999, p. 766) specified a model that “shows an incentive for Congress to time 
changes in the minimum wage just before elections”.  He argues that this was the case over the 
entire history of the minimum wage, starting with the original Fair Labor Standards Act going 
into effect just eight days before election, until the most recent change (1996), just one month 
before the presidential election.  Similarly, in Brazil, the Consolidacao das Leis do Trabalho 
introduced the minimum wage - on the 1
st May 1943, a memorable day - as a prelude to 
amending the Constitution to introduce presidential elections.  In every single electoral year in 
the sample period there was a minimum wage increase - mostly either in the same month, or a 
couple of months before the election.  This is reassuring evidence that the minimum wage is 
used as political propaganda.  Thus, the timing of elections was used to define an “election 
cycle” variable (IV78 for national, and IV79 for municipal elections).
42  The closer the 
elections, the higher the minimum wage.  Table 5.1 confirms the expected negative 
correlations.  The political cycle is assumed to be exogeneous, as it is determined by regular 
intervals of time. 
Further, assume that left-wing politicians are in favour of more generous increases.  The 
lower the minimum wage, the more dissatisfied people, and the more left-wing politicians 
elected.  Data was collected (Nicolau, 1998, also on the internet) on the number (proportion) of 
                                                            
42 Like the voting cycle, the political cycle is a linear (exponential, squared, squared root and log were also 
experimented) time trend between two consecutive elections (IV80 to IV87). 
  25left-wing candidates elected as president, federal deputy, governor, estate deputy, senator, and 
capital mayor (IV88 to IV99).  Although not included in their final version, Baker et al. (1999) 
used a dummy for whether left wing politicians were in power as an instrument.  Similarly, data 
was collected on the number (proportion) of votes for left-wing candidates (IV100 to IV107).  
Table 5.1 shows strong negative correlations, as expected, stronger for proportions.  There is no 
reason to believe that the number of (votes on) left wing politicians is simultaneously 
determined with employment.  Furthermore, as argued in Section 5.4.2, any potential 
correlation with past information is negligible, once elections of politicians only happens every 
4 years. 
It follows that incentives for increases are bigger the more left wing politicians elected and 
the closer the elections.  This translates into weighting the number and proportion of (and votes 
on) left-wing politicians by the election cycle (IV108 to IV127).  Although weighting is 
expected to improve the instruments performance, Table 5.1 shows negative and strong, but not 
stronger, correlations.  Furthermore, incentives for increases are bigger the lower the minimum 
wage; even if the proportion of left wing politicians is high and the next elections are close, not 
much political propaganda is made if the minimum wage is already at a relatively high level.  
Moreover, this re-introduces the real minimum wage variation into the model (Card and 
Krueger, 1995; Machin and Manning, 1994).  Incidentally, Table 5.1 shows that this improves 
the correlations (IV128 to IV147). 
Once more, the above instruments (see Panel III of Table 5.1) are strongly correlated with 
spike but not thought to be endogeneously determined with employment.  Incidentally, the 
Sargan test did not fail the specifications using such instruments (see Table 5.A).   
Some might argue that interactions “fake” the correlation with the endogenous variable and 
“create” a weak instrument; i.e. even if the instrument is uncorrelated with the endogenous 
variable in the population, correlation might not be zero in a finite sample.  There is nothing 
intrinsic about interactions that produce nonzero correlations.  In general, provided that there is 
some  a priori economic reasoning - as exhaustively discussed above - in establishing the 
validity of the instruments, and they pass the appropriate tests (see Table 5.A), nothing 
particular about interactions invalidates instruments.  The issue is about weak instruments, not 
interactions per se.
43  Interactions were here justified for a conceptual reason; incidentally, they 
produce variation in both dimensions (over time and across regions), but in general did not 
produce stronger correlations.  Over half of the above defined instruments are “raw”, i.e. free of 
interactions, and yet correlated with spike (see bold in Table 5.1).  Interactions were motivated 
as further robustness checks and were by no means crucial in defining the instruments.   
The above instruments were grouped to re-estimate the models from Section 5.1: 
A- SPIKE (see Section 4) - plain OLS. 
B- LAGS (see Section 5) - no political variables, just lagged spike as instruments. 
C- RAW - interaction-free political instruments. 
D- TOP30 - subsample from RAW whose correlation with spike was higher than 0.30. 
E- TOP10 - subsample from RAW whose correlation with spike was higher than 0.10. 
F- BILLS (IV20 to IV29) - voting data interacted with voting dummy. 
G- wBILLS ( IV35 to IV50) - voting data interacted with voting cycle. 
                                                            
43 There is a literature on weak instruments biasing the estimates towards OLS.  See original paper by Nagar 
(1959) and then Buse (1992), Angrist and Krueger (1995), Bound et al. (1995), Staiger and Stock (1997), Donald 
et al. (1997) and Krueger et al. (1999). 
  26H- ELECTIONS (IV788 to IV107) - election data. 
I-  wELECTIONS (IV108 to IV127) - election data interacted with (linear) election cycle. 
J-  mwELECTIONS (IV128 to IV147) - election data interacted with (linear) election cycle 
and real minimum wage. 
BRAZIL from 1982 to 2000
correlations with real MW on the top of each graph
graph 3.1 - MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLES OVER TIME
corr: 1.00
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  27EMPLOYMENT EFFECT
hours and job effects
graph 4.2 - OLS ESTIMATES OF THE COEFFICIENTS OF SPIKE
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formal and informal sectors
raph 6.1I - ESTIMATES OF THE COEFFICIENTS OF SPIKE -1st DIFFERENCES
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1 - raw 2 - fi + ft 3 - controls 4 - 12 lags 5 - 24 lags
 
 
  28EMPLOYMENT EFFECT
private and public sectors
raph 6.1II - ESTIMATES OF THE COEFFICIENTS OF SPIKE -1st DIFFERENCE
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table 5.1 - CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE MINIMUM WAGE SPIKE AND POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS - continues
IV spike real MW iv instrument (vary across regions and over time) intuition
I - POLITICIANS DATA
IV1 0.2132 0.6201 cabec nb (out of 100) of most influential politicians in the country the more influential the congressmen and the more pro-increase, the higher the mw
IV2 0.2819 0.1638 pcabe IV2 as a proportion of total influential politicians in the sampled regions as above
IV3 0.0092 0.3836 nota measure of how worker-sympathetic congressmen are the higher the mark, the more pro-increase, the higher the mw
IV4 -0.5585 -0.5077 esq dummy: 1 if left wing, 0 otherwise for congressmen in IV3 (average) the more left wing, the higher the mw
IV5 0.1616 0.0434 uni dummy: 1 if university graduated, 0 otherwise for congressman in IV3 (average) the more education, the bigger the support for a higher mw
IV6 -0.2488 -0.5378 man nb of mandates for congressman in IV3 (average) the longer in power, the less favourable of a higher mw
IV7 -0.4172 -0.3534 notapeIV3*IV4*IV5*IV6
II - VOTING DATA
IV8 -0.4392 -0.5852 ssim nb of senator votes in favour of the mw increase the more congressmen in favour of the increase (as opposed to a bigger increase), the lower the mw
IV9 -0.5559 -0.4807 csim nb of deputy votes in favour of the mw increase as above
IV10 -0.2007 -0.1683 snao nb of senator votes against the mw increase the more congressmen against the increase (as opposed to an increase), the lower the mw
IV11 -0.5022 -0.4872 cnao nb of deputy votes against the mw increase as above
IV12 -0.0684 -0.0495 sabs nb of senators absent when the mw increase was voted the more congressmen absent (the less pressure for a bigger increase), the lower the mw
IV13 -0.1311 -0.3491 cabs nb of deputys absent when the mw increase was voted as above
IV14 -0.5083 -0.5961 pssim IV8 as a proportion of total senator votes as above
IV15 -0.4220 -0.3618 pcsim IV9 as a proportion of total deputy votes as above
IV16 -0.2018 -0.1950 psnao IV10 as a proportion of total senator votes as above
IV17 -0.4685 -0.5968 pcnao IV11 as a proportion of total deputy votes as above
IV18 -0.4705 -0.4917 sen dummy for senator vote: 3 non-secret, 1 secret, and 2 party oriented vote  the more non-secret votes, the lower the mw (non-secret votes expose those against it)
IV19 -0.5862 -0.5958 cam dummy for deputy vote: 3 non-secret, 1 secret, and 2 party oriented vote  as above
IV20 -0.3811 -0.4853 sssim IV8*IV18
IV21 -0.5413 -0.4731 ccsim IV9*IV19
IV22 -0.1867 -0.1497 ssnao IV10*IV18
IV23 -0.4914 -0.4850 ccnao IV11*IV19
IV24 -0.0687 -0.0541 ssabs IV12*IV18
IV25 -0.1167 -0.3394 ccabs IV13*IV19
IV26 -0.4370 -0.4944 spssimIV14*IV18
IV27 -0.1964 -0.1736 spsnaoIV15*IV19
IV28 -0.4381 -0.3384 cpcsimIV16*IV18
IV29 -0.4644 -0.5743 cpcna IV17*IV19
IV30 0.3613 0.2942 cvdes voting cycle (linear) the more often mw bills are voted, the higher the mw
IV31 0.3665 0.2668 cvrootvoting cycle (squared root) as above
IV32 0.0753 0.0172 cvsq voting cycle (squared) as above
IV33 0.3362 0.2208 cvlog voting cycle (log) as above
IV34 0.0810 0.0211 cvexp voting cycle (exponential) as above
IV35 -0.2507 -0.4181 AssimIV8*IV30
IV36 -0.4022 -0.4346 AcsimIV9*IV30
IV37 -0.1659 -0.1355 AsnaoIV10*IV30
IV38 -0.3131 -0.3648 AcnaoIV11*IV30
IV39 -0.3012 -0.4362 ApssimIV14*IV30
IV40 -0.3366 -0.4201 ApcsimIV15*IV30
IV41 -0.1767 -0.1656 ApsnaIV16*IV30
IV42 -0.2767 -0.4185 ApcnaIV17*IV30
IV43 -0.2854 -0.4486 AsssimIV20*IV30
IV44 -0.3969 -0.4259 AccsimIV21*IV30
IV45 -0.1510 -0.1120 AssnaIV22*IV30
IV46 -0.3122 -0.3633 AccnaIV23*IV30
IV47 -0.3364 -0.4725 Aspss IV26*IV30
IV48 -0.3300 -0.4004 AcpcsIV27*IV30
IV49 -0.1649 -0.1455 AspsnIV28*IV30
IV50 -0.2758 -0.4116 AcpcnIV29*IV30
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table 5.1 - CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE MINIMUM WAGE SPIKE AND POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS - continues
IV spike real MW iv instrument (vary across regions and over time) intuition
IV51 -0.3048 -0.3400 npl nb of mw bills by congressman from the sampled regions the more mw bills, the lower is the mw 
IV52 -0.1126 -0.0481 nplesqnb of mw bills by left wing congressman from the sampled regions as above
IV53 -0.3061 -0.3795 nplsimnb of mw increase bills by congressman from the sampled regions as above
IV54 -0.0713 -0.0171 pnplesIV52 as a proportion of IV51 as above
IV55 -0.2907 -0.4357 pnplsi IV53 as a proportion of IV51 as above
IV56 0.0592 0.1424 nplefedummy: 0 if bill not effective and 1 if effective (average)  the more effective the bills, the (less eroded) higher the mw
IV57 -0.0646 0.0409 npldianb days mw bills took to be appreciated (sum) the longer to be appreciated, (the more pressure or the less bargaining power) the higher/lower the mw
IV58 -0.0026 0.1123 npldianb days mw bills took to be appreciated (average) as above
IV59 -0.3166 -0.3862 nplumIV51*IV56
IV60 -0.1139 -0.0822 nplxdi IV51*IV57
IV61 -0.0810 -0.0004 nplxdi IV51*IV58
IV62 -0.1511 -0.1397 ndisc nb of congressman speechs regarding the mw  the more the need for speechs, the lower is the mw 
IV63 -0.1413 -0.1431 ndiscenb of left wing congressman speechs regarding the mw  as above
IV64 -0.1427 -0.1497 ndiscsnb of congressman speechs regarding a mw increase as above
IV65 -0.1371 -0.1195 ndiscf nb of congressman speechs favourable to a mw increase as above
IV66 -0.1001 -0.0923 ndiscanb of congressman speechs against a mw increase as above
IV67 -0.1613 -0.1571 pndiseIV62 as a proportion of speechs from the sampled regions as above
IV68 -0.1697 -0.1848 pndissIV63 as a proportion of speechs from the sampled regions as above
IV69 -0.1256 -0.1347 pndisf IV64 as a proportion of speechs from the sampled regions as above
IV70 -0.0796 -0.0574 pndisaIV65 as a proportion of speechs from the sampled regions as above
IV71 -0.1949 -0.2291 comLRnb of congressman in the mw comission  the more (the need of) congressmen in the comission, the lower the mw 
IV72 -0.2481 -0.1912 comL nb of left wing congressman in the mw comission  as above
IV73 -0.1243 -0.2184 comR nb of right wing congressman in the mw comission  as above
IV74 -0.2013 -0.2966 comLRIV71 as a proportion of comission congressmen  as above
IV75 0.0991 -0.1569 comLRIV71 as a proportion of comission congressmen from the sampled regions as above
IV76 0.0416 -0.0809 comL6IV72 as a proportion of comission congressmen from the sampled regions as above
IV77 0.1009 -0.1559 comRIV73 as a proportion of comission congressmen from the sampled regions as above
III - ELECTIONS DATA
IV78 -0.2676 -0.3490 cn national election cycle (linear) the closer the elections, the lower the mw increase
IV79 -0.0328 -0.0491 cm municipal election cycle (linear) as above
IV80 -0.2214 -0.2992 cnrootnational election cycle (squared root) as above
IV81 -0.0390 -0.0236 cmroomunicipal election cycle (squared root) as above
IV82 -0.3073 -0.3903 cnsq national election cycle (squared) as above
IV83 -0.1994 -0.2164 cmsq municipal election cycle (squared) as above
IV84 -0.1510 -0.2239 cnlog national election cycle (log) as above
IV85 -0.0493 -0.0145 cmlogmunicipal election cycle (log) as above
IV86 -0.0335 -0.0348 cnexpnational election cycle (exponential) as above
IV87 -0.0487 -0.0838 cmexpmunicipal election cycle (exponential) as above
IV88 -0.3801 -0.5398 npres nb of left wing candidates to president elected the lower the mw, the more left wing congressmen elected 
IV89 -0.6359 -0.3390 ndf nb of left wing candidates to federal deputy elected as above
IV90 -0.3445 -0.1933 nsen nb of left wing candidates to senator elected as above
IV91 -0.2283 -0.2528 ngov nb of left wing candidates to governor elected as above
IV92 -0.4884 -0.2849 nde nb of left wing candidates to state deputy elected as above
IV93 -0.0215 -0.0736 npc nb of left wing candidates to capital mayor elected as above
IV94 -0.3801 -0.5398 pres proportion of left wing candidates to president elected the lower the mw, the more left wing congressmen elected 
IV95 -0.6012 -0.4750 df proportion of left wing candidates to federal deputy elected as above
IV96 -0.4473 -0.4598 sen proportion of left wing candidates to senator elected as above
IV97 -0.2796 -0.2793 gov proportion of left wing candidates to governor elected as above
IV98 -0.5973 -0.4813 de proportion of left wing candidates to state deputy elected as above
IV99 -0.0215 -0.0736 pc proportion of left wing candidates to capital mayor elected as above
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table 5.1 - CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE MINIMUM WAGE SPIKE AND POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS - continues
IV spike real MW iv instrument (vary across regions and over time) intuition
IV100 -0.2595 -0.2474 npresvnb of votes in left wing president candidates as above
IV101 -0.1620 -0.1134 ndfv nb of votes in left wing federal deputy candidates as above
IV102 -0.2959 -0.1184 ngovvnb of votes in left wing governor candidates as above
IV103 -0.1458 -0.0605 ndev nb of votes in left wing estate deputy candidates as above
IV104 -0.5419 -0.6878 presv proportion of votes in left wing president candidates as above
IV105 -0.6258 -0.4876 dfv proportion of votes in left wing federal deputy candidates as above
IV106 -0.3882 -0.3027 govv proportion of votes in left wing governor candidates as above
IV107 -0.6087 -0.4948 dev proportion of votes in left wing estate deputy candidates as above
IV108 -0.3273 -0.4600 Enpre IV78*IV98
IV109 -0.4923 -0.3703 Endf IV79*IV98
IV110 -0.3494 -0.2339 EnsenIV80*IV98
IV111 -0.2540 -0.2927 EngovIV81*IV98
IV112 -0.3868 -0.3435 Ende IV82*IV94
IV113 -0.0305 -0.1077 Enpc IV83*IV99
IV114 -0.3273 -0.4600 Epres IV84*IV98
IV115 -0.4563 -0.4540 Edf IV85*IV98
IV116 -0.3948 -0.4792 Esen IV86*IV98
IV117 -0.3089 -0.3129 Egov IV87*IV98
IV118 -0.4478 -0.4556 Ede IV88*IV98
IV119 -0.0305 -0.1077 Epc IV89*IV99
IV120 -0.2295 -0.2594 Enpre IV90*IV98
IV121 -0.1975 -0.0773 Endfv IV91*IV98
IV122 -0.3014 -0.1911 EngovIV92*IV98
IV123 -0.1984 -0.0921 EndevIV93*IV98
IV124 -0.4258 -0.5547 EpresvIV94*IV98
IV125 -0.4544 -0.4609 Edfv IV95*IV98
IV126 -0.3532 -0.3355 EgovvIV96*IV98
IV127 -0.4414 -0.4573 Edev IV97*IV98
IV128 -0.3283 -0.4461 InpresIV108*rmw
IV129 -0.4555 -0.2216 Indf IV109*rmw
IV130 -0.3236 -0.1597 Insen IV110*rmw
IV131 -0.2070 -0.2163 Ingov IV111*rmw
IV132 -0.3340 -0.1590 Inde IV112*rmw
IV133 -0.0326 -0.2369 Inpc IV113*rmw
IV134 -0.3283 -0.4461 Ipres IV114*rmw
IV135 -0.4178 -0.2981 Idf IV115*rmw
IV136 -0.3820 -0.3893 Isen IV116*rmw
IV137 -0.2668 -0.2428 Igov IV117*rmw
IV138 -0.4050 -0.2977 Ide IV118*rmw
IV139 -0.0326 -0.2369 Ipc IV119*rmw
IV140 -0.2286 -0.2395 InpresIV120*rmw
IV141 -0.1661 -0.0639 Indfv IV121*rmw
IV142 -0.2870 -0.1288 IngovvIV122*rmw
IV143 -0.1644 -0.0505 Indev IV123*rmw
IV144 -0.4192 -0.4963 IpresvIV124*rmw
IV145 -0.4135 -0.2900 Idfv IV125*rmw
IV146 -0.3172 -0.2368 Igovv IV126*rmw
IV147 -0.3982 -0.2944 Idev IV127*rmw
source:  IV1-IV44 National Congress; IV45-IV49 DIAP
1) instruments in bold are prior to interaction
 
 table 5.2 - EFFECT OF A 10% INCREASE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE ON EMPLOYMENT 
(across models and variables)
interval average sd mode (rounded)
min max       (across models)            (across models)
  -1.00 1.67 0.16 0.52 -0.33
 WG -0.18 1.13 0.25 0.29 0.19
  -1.14 0.55 -0.11 0.30 0.03
 -2.50 2.80 0.06 0.95 0.29
  FD -2.24 3.02 0.29 1.00 -0.08
  -1.75 0.18 -0.23 0.33 -0.17
 -2.19 1.26 0.34 0.53 0.07
  TD -0.18 1.70 0.25 0.28 0.13
  -2.59 1.00 0.07 0.49 0.09
 -1.71 4.01 0.30 0.92 0.32
  FTD -1.77 3.49 0.35 0.90 0.06
  -0.82 0.67 -0.01 0.24 -0.07
1) For full estimates see table 4.A, panels C to J, in the Appendix.
2) a 10% increase in the minimum wage increases spike by 1% 
3) Dependent variable is average hours worked for the working population, average hours worked for those employed 
and employment rate.  Endogeneous variable is spike.
4) Instruments are lags of spike and political variables.  
5) Hours and Job elasticities add to Total elasticity for the static but not for the dynamic models.
6) Models estimated are Within Groups (WG) and OLS on 1st (FD), 12th (TD) and 1st and 12th differences (FTD).
7) Time effects are modelled with year, seasonal-month, stabilization and 1988 structural break dummies.





























 table 4.A - ESTIMATES OF THE IV SPIKE MODELS -  continues
(1) base (2) fi + ft (3) controls (4) 12 lags (5) 24 lags (6) 12  (7) 24
coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se long run coef
A - SPIKE
0.648 0.072 -0.022 0.095 -0.036 0.099 0.186 0.082 0.203 0.090 0.101 0.108
WG 0.591 0.056 0.210 0.080 0.193 0.084 0.173 0.077 0.200 0.080 0.102 0.109
0.057 0.048 -0.232 0.042 -0.230 0.043 -0.022 0.023 -0.024 0.025 -0.011 -0.013
0.499 0.123 0.625 0.111 0.663 0.111 0.452 0.096 0.441 0.098 -0.139 -0.117
FD 0.496 0.126 0.704 0.110 0.737 0.109 0.459 0.088 0.422 0.090 -0.093 -0.051
0.002 0.039 -0.079 0.034 -0.074 0.027 -0.054 0.026 -0.013 0.030 0.346 0.016
0.649 0.097 0.570 0.102 0.551 0.103 0.342 0.097 0.347 0.083 0.322 0.250
TD 0.447 0.074 0.466 0.095 0.454 0.096 0.315 0.087 0.328 0.074 0.531 0.326
0.202 0.055 0.104 0.044 0.097 0.043 0.002 0.028 -0.012 0.031 0.002 -0.008
0.741 0.118 0.747 0.117 0.779 0.116 0.447 0.094 0.317 0.079 -0.246 -0.084
FTD 0.809 0.116 0.823 0.116 0.844 0.115 0.440 0.088 0.317 0.071 -0.178 -0.059
-0.069 0.032 -0.076 0.032 -0.065 0.030 -0.016 0.028 -0.031 0.027 0.148 0.024
B - LAGS - lagged spike as instruments
0.942 0.077 -0.327 0.137 -0.327 0.139 -0.013 0.123 0.042 0.126 -0.007 0.023
WG 0.629 0.062 -0.023 0.121 -0.021 0.122 -0.029 0.115 0.060 0.112 -0.017 0.033
0.312 0.047 -0.304 0.056 -0.306 0.056 0.033 0.034 -0.011 0.035 0.017 -0.006
-0.197 0.268 0.675 0.195 0.628 0.185 0.556 0.161 0.527 0.187 -0.171 -0.140
FD -0.158 0.257 0.774 0.191 0.738 0.181 0.604 0.141 0.513 0.166 -0.123 -0.062
-0.039 0.077 -0.099 0.059 -0.110 0.047 -0.067 0.045 0.012 0.052 0.435 -0.016
0.408 0.129 0.635 0.184 0.590 0.181 0.169 0.159 0.242 0.132 0.158 0.174
TD 0.320 0.094 0.414 0.164 0.379 0.162 0.126 0.140 0.217 0.109 0.213 0.215
0.087 0.080 0.222 0.081 0.211 0.080 0.082 0.048 0.052 0.053 0.054 0.034
0.776 0.185 0.907 0.166 0.956 0.171 0.374 0.146 0.228 0.126 -0.206 -0.059
FTD 0.877 0.183 0.954 0.163 0.975 0.168 0.308 0.131 0.192 0.111 -0.124 -0.035
-0.100 0.053 -0.047 0.046 -0.019 0.043 0.037 0.038 0.008 0.043 -0.351 -0.006
C - RAW - interaction-free political instruments
0.800 0.081 -0.370 0.148 -0.317 0.148 0.067 0.124 0.156 0.136 0.037 0.083
WG 0.701 0.065 0.068 0.124 0.075 0.127 0.074 0.114 0.140 0.117 0.043 0.076
0.098 0.057 -0.438 0.070 -0.392 0.064 0.000 0.042 0.033 0.045 0.000 0.017
0.156 0.332 0.142 0.297 0.198 0.295 -0.107 0.246 0.022 0.297 0.032 -0.006
FD 0.147 0.340 0.346 0.287 0.442 0.282 0.086 0.223 0.176 0.270 -0.017 -0.021
0.010 0.084 -0.204 0.079 -0.244 0.070 -0.270 0.068 -0.106 0.089 2.199 0.141
0.710 0.168 0.329 0.200 0.307 0.200 0.164 0.206 -0.161 0.161 0.153 -0.115
TD 0.334 0.126 0.234 0.187 0.219 0.188 0.104 0.187 0.070 0.142 0.174 0.070
0.376 0.085 0.094 0.084 0.088 0.080 0.037 0.059 -0.131 0.061 0.024 -0.086
1.077 0.340 0.666 0.315 0.814 0.312 0.456 0.262 -0.230 0.244 -0.245 0.056
FTD 1.151 0.343 0.880 0.315 1.037 0.307 0.535 0.239 0.040 0.206 -0.214 -0.007
-0.074 0.080 -0.214 0.071 -0.223 0.070 -0.120 0.069 -0.235 0.077 1.034 0.185
D - TOP30 - subsample from RAW whose correlation with spike was higher than 0.30
1.056 0.089 -0.255 0.209 -0.237 0.206 0.230 0.151 0.365 0.165 0.125 0.190
WG 0.855 0.072 0.268 0.162 0.282 0.167 0.131 0.143 0.191 0.141 0.077 0.104
0.201 0.061 -0.523 0.106 -0.519 0.103 0.054 0.057 0.057 0.061 0.028 0.030
0.700 0.582 0.035 0.505 0.288 0.493 -0.290 0.397 -0.050 0.450 0.087 0.013
FD 0.899 0.581 0.208 0.473 0.439 0.469 -0.079 0.373 0.167 0.410 0.016 -0.020
-0.199 0.168 -0.173 0.162 -0.151 0.131 -0.262 0.126 -0.101 0.132 2.129 0.132
0.447 0.221 0.766 0.335 0.633 0.350 0.505 0.323 0.070 0.235 0.475 0.051
TD 0.328 0.167 0.462 0.293 0.296 0.308 0.147 0.287 0.229 0.211 0.248 0.227
0.119 0.114 0.304 0.147 0.337 0.145 0.182 0.100 -0.063 0.089 0.118 -0.042
0.265 0.635 -0.145 0.502 0.077 0.500 0.003 0.381 -0.211 0.346 -0.002 0.053
FTD -0.022 0.632 -0.338 0.504 -0.087 0.505 -0.129 0.350 -0.188 0.325 0.052 0.032
0.287 0.201 0.194 0.149 0.164 0.145 0.113 0.121 -0.071 0.112 -1.046 0.056
E - TOP10 - subsample from RAW whose correlation with spike was higher than 0.10
  0.794 0.080 -0.299 0.160 -0.270 0.162 0.141 0.129 0.243 0.141 0.076 0.128
  WG 0.703 0.064 0.145 0.134 0.157 0.137 0.120 0.118 0.195 0.122 0.070 0.106
  0.091 0.057 -0.444 0.073 -0.427 0.072 0.032 0.044 0.041 0.047 0.017 0.021
  0.635 0.478 0.458 0.408 0.728 0.413 0.067 0.323 0.294 0.346 -0.020 -0.077
  FD 0.889 0.485 0.607 0.394 0.902 0.399 0.340 0.299 0.475 0.317 -0.069 -0.057
  -0.253 0.126 -0.149 0.117 -0.174 0.102 -0.237 0.098 -0.061 0.108 1.871 0.079
  0.654 0.180 0.559 0.238 0.459 0.244 0.483 0.239 0.073 0.188 0.454 0.052
  TD 0.288 0.137 0.442 0.213 0.323 0.217 0.287 0.216 0.235 0.168 0.483 0.233
  0.366 0.099 0.117 0.105 0.136 0.102 0.023 0.074 -0.120 0.073 0.015 -0.079
 0.965 0.404 0.624 0.364 0.613 0.358 0.061 0.287 -0.195 0.266 -0.033 0.049
  FTD 1.062 0.417 0.654 0.371 0.706 0.361 0.185 0.258 0.035 0.230 -0.075 -0.006
  -0.097 0.109 -0.030 0.089 -0.093 0.084 -0.060 0.080 -0.165 0.087 0.574 0.130
1) Dependent variable is average hours worked for the working population, average hours worked for those employed and employment rate.  
    Endogeneous variable is spike.
2) Hours and Job elasticities add to Total elasticity for the static but not for the dynamic models:
3) Colum 1 shows raw correlations, and columns 2-5 add time and region fixed effects, controls, 12 and 24 lags of dependent variable, respectively.

























































































  34table 4.A - ESTIMATES OF THE IV SPIKE MODELS -  continued
(1) base (2) fi + ft (3) controls (4) 12 lags (5) 24 lags (6) 12  (7) 24
coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se long run coef
F - BILLS - voting data interacted with voting dummy
 1.674 0.132 -1.000 0.384 -0.541 0.360 0.101 0.272 0.196 0.292 0.055 0.104
  WG 1.126 0.104 0.142 0.280 0.363 0.268 0.189 0.242 0.157 0.230 0.110 0.085
  0.548 0.072 -1.142 0.197 -0.904 0.181 0.007 0.106 0.012 0.118 0.004 0.007
 -1.785 1.401 -2.498 1.625 -2.044 1.843 -0.799 1.302 -0.234 1.078 0.237 0.060
  FD -1.332 1.324 -2.071 1.494 -1.664 1.708 0.568 1.071 0.966 0.925 -0.116 -0.118
  -0.453 0.387 -0.427 0.380 -0.379 0.377 -0.599 0.386 -0.644 0.394 8.597 0.908
 -2.193 0.592 -0.152 0.606 -0.122 0.597 -0.069 0.555 -0.592 0.409 -0.065 -0.422
  TD 0.398 0.330 0.134 0.505 0.169 0.504 0.007 0.474 -0.063 0.337 0.013 -0.062
  -2.592 0.488 -0.286 0.255 -0.291 0.242 -0.180 0.174 -0.261 0.149 -0.117 -0.170
 0.733 1.197 -1.710 1.208 -1.422 1.155 0.243 0.798 -0.111 0.733 -0.133 0.028
  FTD 0.058 1.095 -1.774 1.148 -1.509 1.115 0.451 0.715 0.015 0.653 -0.183 -0.003
  0.675 0.413 0.064 0.282 0.087 0.271 -0.065 0.225 0.016 0.253 0.620 -0.012
G - wBILLS - voting data interacted with voting cycle
 0.974 0.129 -0.434 0.268 -0.029 0.267 0.219 0.244 0.424 0.268 0.095 0.185
  WG 0.842 0.104 -0.109 0.217 0.192 0.222 0.130 0.231 0.380 0.228 0.056 0.158
  0.132 0.079 -0.326 0.136 -0.220 0.130 0.031 0.077 0.039 0.081 0.011 0.014
 2.799 1.527 -1.050 0.764 -0.745 0.793 0.030 0.603 0.105 0.614 -0.013 -0.017
  FD 3.022 1.481 -0.337 0.669 -0.285 0.714 -0.092 0.573 -0.081 0.551 0.016 0.014
  -0.222 0.397 -0.714 0.275 -0.460 0.239 -0.273 0.222 -0.193 0.200 0.929 0.146
 1.259 0.616 0.402 0.497 0.475 0.486 0.816 0.417 -0.059 0.295 0.800 -0.030
  TD 1.696 0.507 0.319 0.413 0.486 0.408 0.529 0.347 -0.003 0.260 0.908 0.089
  -0.436 0.331 0.083 0.246 -0.011 0.228 -0.077 0.132 -0.107 0.108 -0.053 -0.067
 1.750 1.258 0.594 0.796 0.937 0.780 0.792 0.583 -0.564 0.507 -0.440 0.166
  FTD 1.979 1.236 1.411 0.802 1.628 0.797 0.988 0.549 -0.587 0.501 -0.435 0.129
  -0.229 0.338 -0.817 0.208 -0.691 0.198 -0.301 0.144 -0.229 0.118 2.390 0.125
H - ELECTIONS - election data
 0.857 0.084 -0.122 0.224 -0.144 0.223 0.329 0.168 0.524 0.183 0.177 0.270
  WG 0.699 0.067 0.186 0.176 0.137 0.180 0.043 0.152 0.263 0.162 0.025 0.142
  0.158 0.061 -0.307 0.115 -0.280 0.111 0.118 0.058 0.109 0.062 0.061 0.056
 1.067 2.066 0.053 1.224 1.083 0.974 1.098 0.773 0.944 0.775 -0.343 -0.256
  FD 1.257 2.074 0.054 1.157 1.262 0.946 0.881 0.733 1.051 0.731 -0.182 -0.129
  -0.191 0.673 -0.001 0.363 -0.179 0.262 -0.248 0.259 -0.217 0.275 1.977 0.288
 1.076 0.234 0.398 0.327 0.470 0.336 0.387 0.368 -0.382 0.347 0.364 -0.273
  TD 0.578 0.181 -0.173 0.301 -0.088 0.308 -0.002 0.337 0.128 0.307 -0.003 0.127
  0.498 0.135 0.571 0.176 0.558 0.172 0.137 0.113 -0.377 0.124 0.089 -0.245
 4.012 4.494 0.323 1.609 -1.284 2.084 -0.315 0.930 -1.569 1.364 0.170 0.344
  FTD 3.491 3.983 0.134 1.522 -1.391 2.118 -0.349 0.869 -0.685 1.034 0.141 0.111
  0.521 0.908 0.189 0.421 0.107 0.497 0.165 0.270 0.153 0.507 -1.519 -0.119
I - wELECTIONS - election data interacted with (linear) election cycle
 1.050 0.139 -0.245 0.288 -0.288 0.278 0.179 0.243 0.305 0.243 0.097 0.160
  WG 0.776 0.106 0.080 0.252 0.024 0.246 0.071 0.223 0.275 0.207 0.041 0.149
  0.274 0.078 -0.325 0.104 -0.312 0.095 0.029 0.066 -0.021 0.069 0.015 -0.011
 0.625 3.098 -0.375 1.534 -0.716 1.484 -1.435 1.381 -2.310 1.840 0.419 0.548
  FD 2.378 3.213 -0.558 1.474 -0.877 1.425 -1.627 1.199 -2.238 1.648 0.304 0.242
  -1.753 1.689 0.184 0.417 0.161 0.377 -0.037 0.332 0.044 0.383 0.235 -0.056
 0.127 0.270 0.966 0.643 1.019 0.664 1.066 0.795 0.249 0.526 1.003 0.179
  TD 0.173 0.223 -0.009 0.532 0.017 0.544 0.568 0.708 0.395 0.488 0.956 0.393
  -0.046 0.101 0.976 0.293 1.001 0.296 0.226 0.166 -0.134 0.161 0.147 -0.088
 0.587 1.620 0.423 0.822 1.141 0.890 0.068 1.201 -1.588 1.504 -0.037 0.348
  FTD 0.417 1.552 0.457 0.767 1.083 0.845 -0.233 1.184 -1.521 1.164 0.094 0.222
  0.170 0.429 -0.034 0.196 0.058 0.214 0.267 0.240 0.337 0.259 -2.411 -0.259
J - mwELECTIONS - election data interacted with (linear) election cycle and real minimum wage
  1.081 0.142 -0.333 0.327 -0.423 0.308 0.085 0.253 0.161 0.241 0.046 0.085
  WG 0.743 0.106 -0.115 0.283 -0.181 0.270 -0.033 0.235 0.138 0.203 -0.019 0.075
  0.338 0.079 -0.218 0.104 -0.242 0.093 0.031 0.061 -0.032 0.061 0.016 -0.017
  1.233 1.127 0.378 0.647 0.441 0.695 -0.253 0.646 -0.753 0.698 0.076 0.190
  FD 2.530 1.252 0.318 0.643 0.428 0.679 0.038 0.594 -0.433 0.624 -0.008 0.050
  -1.297 0.569 0.060 0.202 0.013 0.176 -0.206 0.150 -0.168 0.149 1.567 0.222
  0.023 0.278 0.540 0.546 0.608 0.545 0.281 0.546 -0.335 0.407 0.265 -0.239
  TD 0.130 0.234 -0.180 0.495 0.011 0.485 0.007 0.494 0.005 0.355 0.012 0.005
  -0.107 0.101 0.720 0.222 0.597 0.204 0.117 0.124 -0.222 0.116 0.076 -0.145
 0.468 1.257 0.051 0.658 0.518 0.671 0.456 0.746 -0.768 0.765 -0.252 0.181
  FTD 0.276 1.201 0.059 0.636 0.520 0.645 0.657 0.682 -0.242 0.599 -0.266 0.041
  0.192 0.383 -0.008 0.192 -0.002 0.178 0.004 0.171 0.078 0.177 -0.038 -0.061
5) Panel A shows OLS estimates and panels B to J show IV estimates using lags of spike and political variables as instruments.  
     (see Section 5.2 for panel definitions).
6) Each panel has Within Groups (WG) and OLS on 1st (FD), 12th (TD) and 1st and 12th differences (FTD).
7) Time effects are modelled with year, seasonal-month, stabilization and 1988 structural break dummies.





















































  35 
table 5.A - ESTIMATES OF THE COEFFICIENTS OF THE SPIKE - continues
(1) base (2) fi + ft (3) controls (4) 12 lags (5) 24 lags
coef se Sd fHs e Fd f coef se Sd fHs e Fd f coef se Sd fHs e Fd f coef se Sd fHs e Fd f coef se Sd fHs e Fd f
B- LAGS
WG 0.629 0.062 1053.71 11 -0.36 0.17 381.52 12/1049 -0.023 0.121 27.54 10 0.27 0.17 181.27 48/1013 -0.021 0.122 31.80 10 0.23 0.17 133.96 66/995 -0.029 0.115 37.56 10 0.41 0.16 123.81 78/983 0.060 0.112 36.22 10 0.30 0.16 89.46 88/901
0.312 0.047 512.07 11 -0.69 0.13 381.52 12/1049 -0.304 0.056 15.36 10 0.08 0.08 181.27 48/1013 -0.306 0.056 13.12 10 0.09 0.08 133.96 66/995 0.033 0.034 19.19 10 -0.10 0.05 121.26 78/983 -0.011 0.035 13.40 10 -0.02 0.05 83.71 88/901
FD -0.158 0.257 46.35 11 0.66 0.30 16.97 12/1049 0.774 0.191 26.91 10 -0.24 0.23 8.99 48/1013 0.738 0.181 23.86 10 -0.16 0.23 7.91 66/995 0.604 0.141 22.87 10 -0.22 0.17 7.01 78/977 0.513 0.166 24.80 10 -0.13 0.20 6.35 88/895
-0.039 0.077 37.33 11 0.05 0.09 16.97 12/1049 -0.099 0.059 16.33 10 0.02 0.07 8.99 48/1013 -0.110 0.047 12.86 10 0.05 0.06 7.91 66/995 -0.067 0.045 14.81 10 0.02 0.06 6.51 78/977 0.012 0.052 14.50 10 0.03 0.03 33.21 88/895
TD 0.320 0.094 48.12 11 0.14 0.15 75.85 12/977 0.414 0.164 53.04 10 0.09 0.20 30.12 46/943 0.379 0.162 56.64 10 0.12 0.20 22.70 64/925 0.126 0.140 34.94 10 0.30 0.18 22.15 76/913 0.217 0.109 31.23 10 0.17 0.14 17.01 87/830
0.087 0.080 48.65 11 -0.31 0.11 75.85 12/977 0.222 0.081 45.55 10 -0.19 0.10 30.12 46/943 0.211 0.080 43.57 10 -0.18 0.10 22.70 64/925 0.082 0.048 26.49 10 -0.13 0.06 20.06 76/913 0.052 0.053 18.28 10 -0.10 0.06 16.64 87/830
FTD 0.877 0.183 49.00 11 -0.26 0.23 31.43 12/977 0.954 0.163 43.15 10 -0.37 0.20 12.59 46/943 0.975 0.168 39.81 10 0.36 0.20 10.42 64/925 0.308 0.131 33.22 10 0.22 0.17 9.32 76/907 0.192 0.111 29.16 10 0.20 0.15 8.79 86/825
-0.100 0.053 9.34 11 0.09 0.06 31.43 12/977 -0.047 0.046 16.99 10 0.00 0.06 12.59 46/943 -0.019 0.043 13.58 10 -0.01 0.06 10.42 64/925 0.037 0.038 19.95 10 -0.09 0.05 9.36 76/907 0.008 0.043 23.73 10 -0.07 0.06 8.46 86/825
C - RAW
WG 0.701 0.065 1117.36 74 -0.54 0.14 63.08 72/1052 0.068 0.124 228.44 73 0.23 0.15 78.61 109/1015 0.075 0.127 225.91 73 0.20 0.15 74.37 127/985 0.074 0.114 138.81 73 0.17 0.14 73.02 138/914 0.140 0.117 151.63 73 0.11 0.14 41.47 148/832
0.098 0.057 973.85 74 -0.18 0.13 63.08 72/1052 -0.438 0.070 396.26 73 0.33 0.09 78.61 109/1015 -0.392 0.064 404.31 73 0.27 0.09 74.37 127/985 0.000 0.042 131.18 73 -0.04 0.05 120.52 138/914 0.033 0.045 121.34 73 -0.09 0.06 42.79 148/832
FD 0.147 0.340 107.89 74 0.44 0.34 4.41 71/1052 0.346 0.287 71.73 73 0.26 0.31 7.01 108/1015 0.442 0.282 75.23 73 0.34 0.30 5.82 126/985 0.086 0.223 114.34 73 0.43 0.23 3.45 137/908 0.176 0.270 136.43 73 0.28 0.29 2.78 147/826
0.010 0.084 167.31 74 -0.11 0.09 4.41 71/1052 -0.204 0.079 77.22 73 0.11 0.09 7.01 108/1015 -0.244 0.070 63.87 73 0.20 0.07 5.82 126/985 -0.270 0.068 111.86 73 0.25 0.07 3.79 137/908 -0.106 0.089 105.62 73 -0.01 0.03 44.39 148/826
TD 0.334 0.126 193.83 74 0.20 0.16 10.48 72/980 0.234 0.187 153.83 73 0.30 0.20 9.43 108/944 0.219 0.188 145.72 73 0.31 0.20 7.82 126/920 0.104 0.187 169.67 73 0.27 0.19 7.67 136/844 0.070 0.142 141.01 73 0.34 0.15 9.54 146/761
0.376 0.085 517.12 74 -0.32 0.11 10.48 72/980 0.094 0.084 250.11 73 0.01 0.09 9.43 108/944 0.088 0.080 261.93 73 0.01 0.09 7.82 126/920 0.037 0.059 139.56 73 -0.04 0.07 7.57 136/844 -0.131 0.061 150.36 73 0.16 0.07 7.51 147/761
FTD 1.151 0.343 73.95 74 -0.40 0.36 4.60 71/980 0.880 0.315 147.75 73 -0.08 0.33 5.04 108/944 1.037 0.307 153.11 73 -0.23 0.32 4.57 125/920 0.535 0.239 157.76 73 -0.11 0.25 3.26 136/838 0.040 0.206 133.76 73 0.31 0.22 3.23 146/756
-0.074 0.080 95.48 74 0.01 0.09 4.60 71/980 -0.214 0.071 108.15 73 0.16 0.08 5.04 108/944 -0.223 0.070 96.75 73 0.19 0.08 4.57 125/920 -0.120 0.069 134.13 73 0.12 0.07 2.91 136/838 -0.235 0.077 124.11 73 0.23 0.08 3.24 146/756
D - TOP30
WG 0.855 0.072 1117.29 25 -0.78 0.13 112.57 26/1107 0.268 0.162 131.28 24 -0.07 0.18 129.24 63/1070 0.282 0.167 128.70 24 -0.11 0.18 97.95 81/1040 0.131 0.143 56.01 24 0.06 0.16 86.12 92/969 0.191 0.141 59.67 24 0.01 0.15 61.72 102/887
0.201 0.061 878.93 25 -0.43 0.11 112.57 26/1107 -0.523 0.106 284.53 24 0.37 0.12 129.24 63/1070 -0.519 0.103 285.47 24 0.37 0.11 97.95 81/1040 0.054 0.057 39.49 24 -0.10 0.06 88.19 92/969 0.057 0.061 35.96 24 -0.10 0.07 59.07 102/887
FD 0.899 0.581 16.83 25 -0.36 0.57 1.80 26/1107 0.208 0.473 21.24 24 0.45 0.50 3.61 63/1070 0.439 0.469 17.70 24 0.31 0.49 3.12 81/1040 -0.079 0.373 36.09 24 0.57 0.39 2.79 92/963 0.167 0.410 35.68 24 0.27 0.43 2.68 102/881
-0.199 0.168 40.33 25 0.06 0.17 1.80 26/1107 -0.173 0.162 18.07 24 0.12 0.17 3.61 63/1070 -0.151 0.131 13.86 24 0.08 0.13 3.12 81/1040 -0.262 0.126 35.74 24 0.22 0.12 2.40 92/963 -0.101 0.132 33.42 24 0.00 0.03 54.52 102/881
TD 0.328 0.167 80.83 25 0.15 0.18 9.64 26/1035 0.462 0.293 60.05 24 0.00 0.30 12.60 62/999 0.296 0.308 51.18 24 0.17 0.31 9.84 80/975 0.147 0.287 63.78 24 0.19 0.29 8.86 90/899 0.229 0.211 68.00 24 0.11 0.22 7.31 101/816
0.119 0.114 346.94 25 0.11 0.12 9.64 26/1035 0.304 0.147 130.57 24 -0.22 0.15 12.60 62/999 0.337 0.145 141.34 24 -0.26 0.15 9.84 80/975 0.182 0.100 55.90 24 -0.20 0.10 8.33 90/899 -0.063 0.089 55.76 24 0.06 0.09 6.95 101/816
FTD -0.022 0.632 12.77 25 0.84 0.66 1.19 26/1035 -0.338 0.504 27.89 24 1.23 0.51 1.08 62/999 -0.087 0.505 30.63 24 0.97 0.52 1.07 80/975 -0.129 0.350 27.89 24 0.60 0.35 2.42 90/893 -0.188 0.325 35.37 24 0.53 0.33 2.89 100/811
0.287 0.201 19.99 25 -0.35 0.19 1.19 26/1035 0.194 0.149 30.99 24 -0.28 0.15 1.08 62/999 0.164 0.145 31.42 24 -0.24 0.14 1.07 80/975 0.113 0.121 35.43 24 -0.14 0.12 1.18 90/893 -0.071 0.112 33.62 24 0.04 0.11 1.36 100/811
E - TOP10
WG 0.703 0.064 1121.57 54 -0.48 0.14 65.06 52/1078 0.145 0.134 198.70 53 0.10 0.16 93.21 89/1041 0.157 0.137 194.23 53 0.06 0.16 79.74 107/1011 0.120 0.118 101.58 53 0.09 0.14 88.39 118/940 0.195 0.122 105.97 53 0.01 0.14 44.02 128/858
0.091 0.057 948.26 54 -0.14 0.13 65.06 52/1078 -0.444 0.073 358.29 53 0.32 0.09 93.21 89/1041 -0.427 0.072 360.48 53 0.30 0.09 79.74 107/1011 0.032 0.044 86.65 53 -0.08 0.05 118.13 118/940 0.041 0.047 79.14 53 -0.09 0.06 46.57 128/858
FD 0.889 0.485 58.69 54 -0.42 0.48 1.71 51/1078 0.607 0.394 34.67 53 0.04 0.41 2.93 88/1041 0.902 0.399 32.50 53 -0.18 0.41 2.63 106/1011 0.340 0.299 74.85 53 0.13 0.32 2.46 117/934 0.475 0.317 78.72 53 -0.06 0.34 2.50 127/852
-0.253 0.126 66.42 54 0.21 0.12 1.71 51/1078 -0.149 0.117 37.21 53 0.08 0.12 2.93 88/1041 -0.174 0.102 39.13 53 0.11 0.10 2.63 106/1011 -0.237 0.098 78.66 53 0.20 0.10 2.14 117/934 -0.061 0.108 70.57 53 -0.01 0.03 47.77 128/852
TD 0.288 0.137 129.03 54 0.23 0.16 7.52 52/1006 0.442 0.213 98.76 53 0.03 0.23 9.36 88/970 0.323 0.217 91.51 53 0.15 0.23 7.71 106/946 0.287 0.216 106.00 53 0.03 0.22 7.45 116/870 0.235 0.168 104.34 53 0.11 0.18 7.10 127/787
0.366 0.099 450.99 54 -0.24 0.11 7.52 52/1006 0.117 0.105 206.15 53 -0.01 0.11 9.36 88/970 0.136 0.102 227.55 53 -0.05 0.11 7.71 106/946 0.023 0.074 100.50 53 -0.02 0.08 7.23 116/870 -0.120 0.073 106.14 53 0.13 0.08 6.45 127/787
FTD 1.062 0.417 47.82 54 -0.29 0.45 1.64 52/1006 0.654 0.371 82.42 53 0.18 0.39 1.66 88/970 0.706 0.361 95.85 53 0.15 0.38 1.66 106/946 0.185 0.258 63.48 53 0.28 0.27 2.57 116/864 0.035 0.230 72.20 53 0.31 0.24 2.78 126/782
-0.097 0.109 52.57 54 0.04 0.12 1.64 52/1006 -0.030 0.089 61.43 53 -0.05 0.10 1.66 88/970 -0.093 0.084 67.20 53 0.03 0.09 1.66 106/946 -0.060 0.080 78.72 53 0.05 0.08 1.66 116/864 -0.165 0.087 78.87 53 0.15 0.09 1.79 126/782
1) Dependent variable is average hours worked for the working population, average hours worked for those employed and employment rate.  Endogeneous variable is spike.
2) Colum 1 shows coefficients for raw correlations, and associated standard errors, Sargan test, Hausman test and F test ( step of the 2SLS).  
    Columns 2-5  add time and region fixed effects, controls, 12 and 24 lags of dependent variable, respectively.
3) Degree of freedom for Sargan and F test are indicated.  Standard errors for Hausman test are indicated.
5) Panels B to J show IV estimates using lags of spike and political variables as instruments.  
     (see Section 5.2 for panel definitions).
5) Each panel has Within Groups (WG) and OLS on 1st (FD), 12th (TD) and 1st and 12th differences (FTD).
6) Time effects are modelled with year, seasonal-month, stabilization and 1988 structural break dummies.
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table 5.A - ESTIMATES OF THE COEFFICIENTS OF THE SPIKE - continued
(1) base (2) fi + ft (3) controls (4) 12 lags (5) 24 lags
coef se Sd fHs e Fd f coef se Sd fHs e Fd f coef se Sd fHs e Fd f coef se Sd fHs e Fd f coef se Sd fHs e Fd f
F - BILLS
WG 1.126 0.104 1120.72 11 -0.95 0.13 125.02 12/1121 0.142 0.280 35.57 10 0.07 0.29 103.19 49/1084 0.363 0.268 33.09 10 -0.18 0.28 70.13 67/1054 0.189 0.242 11.86 10 -0.02 0.25 59.56 78/983 0.157 0.230 12.96 10 0.05 0.25 39.79 88/901
0.548 0.072 638.39 11 -0.87 0.08 125.02 12/1121 -1.142 0.197 86.83 10 0.96 0.22 103.19 49/1084 -0.904 0.181 103.79 10 0.72 0.20 70.13 67/1054 0.007 0.106 14.86 10 -0.03 0.11 61.53 78/983 0.012 0.118 15.94 10 -0.04 0.12 41.80 88/901
FD -1.332 1.324 3.21 11 2.00 1.29 5.38 12/1121 -2.071 1.494 2.28 10 2.68 1.20 7.00 49/1084 -1.664 1.708 2.30 10 2.41 1.42 4.63 67/1054 0.568 1.071 11.97 10 -0.11 1.08 3.29 78/977 0.966 0.925 7.84 10 -0.55 0.92 3.08 88/895
-0.453 0.387 9.05 11 0.24 0.39 5.38 12/1121 -0.427 0.380 6.38 10 0.36 0.36 7.00 49/1084 -0.379 0.377 4.50 10 0.31 0.36 4.63 67/1054 -0.599 0.386 5.32 10 0.55 0.35 3.16 78/977 -0.644 0.394 4.30 10 0.02 0.03 38.09 88/895
TD 0.398 0.330 28.00 11 0.05 0.33 25.36 12/1049 0.134 0.505 12.79 10 0.34 0.50 21.89 48/1013 0.169 0.504 14.34 10 0.29 0.50 11.56 66/989 0.007 0.474 14.08 10 0.32 0.48 9.77 76/913 -0.063 0.337 15.27 10 0.41 0.33 16.93 87/830
-2.592 0.488 31.88 11 2.90 0.24 25.36 12/1049 -0.286 0.255 43.48 10 0.40 0.25 21.89 48/1013 -0.291 0.242 46.03 10 0.40 0.24 11.56 66/989 -0.180 0.174 13.63 10 0.19 0.17 9.60 76/913 -0.261 0.149 17.52 10 0.26 0.15 12.47 87/830
FTD 0.058 1.095 1.68 11 0.79 1.09 19.71 12/1049 -1.774 1.148 4.34 10 2.62 0.95 3.49 48/1013 -1.509 1.115 4.07 10 2.37 0.95 6.07 66/989 0.451 0.715 10.53 10 -0.01 0.72 7.91 76/907 0.015 0.653 22.29 10 0.31 0.66 6.09 86/825
0.675 0.413 2.29 11 -0.76 0.34 19.71 12/1049 0.064 0.282 7.11 10 -0.14 0.28 3.49 48/1013 0.087 0.271 5.39 10 -0.15 0.27 6.07 66/989 -0.065 0.225 12.11 10 0.05 0.23 3.28 76/907 0.016 0.253 18.44 10 -0.05 0.25 2.66 86/825
G - wBILLS
WG 0.842 0.104 1128.71 15 -0.34 0.12 34.06 16/1117 -0.109 0.217 55.83 14 0.35 0.22 103.91 53/1080 0.192 0.222 54.97 14 0.00 0.23 74.54 71/1050 0.130 0.231 39.13 14 0.05 0.24 62.13 82/979 0.380 0.228 36.40 14 -0.20 0.23 40.59 92/897
0.132 0.079 613.54 15 -0.10 0.09 34.06 16/1117 -0.326 0.136 95.68 14 0.10 0.15 103.91 53/1080 -0.220 0.130 93.27 14 -0.01 0.14 74.54 71/1050 0.031 0.077 23.51 14 -0.06 0.08 67.13 82/979 0.039 0.081 19.46 14 -0.07 0.08 42.64 92/897
FD 3.022 1.481 5.17 15 -2.27 1.20 0.92 16/1117 -0.337 0.669 6.42 14 1.06 0.66 3.80 53/1080 -0.285 0.714 5.85 14 1.04 0.70 3.16 71/1050 -0.092 0.573 32.95 14 0.56 0.58 2.80 82/973 -0.081 0.551 31.42 14 0.52 0.55 2.61 92/891
-0.222 0.397 4.69 15 0.17 0.38 0.92 16/1117 -0.714 0.275 5.28 14 0.66 0.23 3.80 53/1080 -0.460 0.239 5.37 14 0.39 0.21 3.16 71/1050 -0.273 0.222 19.41 14 0.22 0.21 2.28 82/973 -0.193 0.200 19.82 14 0.02 0.03 35.40 92/891
TD 1.696 0.507 33.66 15 -1.27 0.44 2.30 16/1045 0.319 0.413 71.33 14 0.15 0.42 14.35 52/1009 0.486 0.408 74.89 14 -0.03 0.41 11.09 70/985 0.529 0.347 46.65 14 -0.22 0.35 9.04 80/909 -0.003 0.260 42.52 14 0.36 0.26 7.21 91/826
-0.436 0.331 86.10 15 0.65 0.32 2.30 16/1045 0.083 0.246 62.66 14 0.02 0.25 14.35 52/1009 -0.011 0.228 70.37 14 0.11 0.23 11.09 70/985 -0.077 0.132 38.02 14 0.08 0.13 9.37 80/909 -0.107 0.108 48.42 14 0.10 0.11 7.33 91/826
FTD 1.979 1.236 4.16 15 -1.16 1.16 0.58 16/1045 1.411 0.802 39.19 14 -0.60 0.81 1.30 52/1009 1.628 0.797 39.43 14 0.81 0.80 1.22 70/985 0.988 0.549 43.22 14 -0.56 0.54 2.49 80/903 -0.587 0.501 27.28 14 0.93 0.47 3.03 90/821
-0.229 0.338 8.02 15 0.16 0.34 0.58 16/1045 -0.817 0.208 7.39 14 0.76 0.17 1.30 52/1009 -0.691 0.198 7.84 14 0.65 0.17 1.22 70/985 -0.301 0.144 15.86 14 0.30 0.14 1.41 80/903 -0.229 0.118 25.43 14 0.21 0.12 1.72 90/821
H - ELECTIONS
WG 0.699 0.067 1110.87 17 -0.36 0.12 150.25 15/1115 0.186 0.176 105.83 16 0.03 0.18 110.56 52/1078 0.137 0.180 108.64 16 0.07 0.19 80.57 70/1048 0.043 0.152 41.86 16 0.16 0.16 70.52 81/977 0.263 0.162 44.52 16 -0.08 0.16 50.22 91/895
0.158 0.061 846.62 17 -0.34 0.12 150.25 15/1115 -0.307 0.115 214.65 16 0.09 0.13 110.56 52/1078 -0.280 0.111 223.13 16 0.06 0.12 80.57 70/1048 0.118 0.058 23.83 16 -0.17 0.06 95.41 81/977 0.109 0.062 26.54 16 -0.16 0.07 54.98 91/895
FD 1.257 2.074 4.55 17 -0.63 1.92 0.26 14/1115 0.054 1.157 9.64 16 0.69 1.11 3.57 51/1078 1.262 0.946 7.79 16 -0.53 0.93 2.98 69/1048 0.881 0.733 20.21 16 -0.43 0.73 2.59 80/971 1.051 0.731 22.52 16 -0.64 0.71 2.42 90/889
-0.191 0.673 15.50 17 -0.67 0.61 0.26 14/1115 -0.001 0.363 4.97 16 -0.10 0.35 3.57 51/1078 -0.179 0.262 6.89 16 0.11 0.26 2.98 69/1048 -0.248 0.259 29.30 16 0.20 0.25 2.16 80/971 -0.217 0.275 22.42 16 0.00 0.03 51.65 91/889
TD 0.578 0.181 37.86 17 -0.16 0.19 12.17 15/1043 -0.173 0.301 23.94 16 0.69 0.30 13.36 51/1007 -0.088 0.308 26.46 16 0.58 0.31 10.03 69/983 -0.002 0.337 45.44 16 0.34 0.34 8.48 79/907 0.128 0.307 55.44 16 0.21 0.31 7.03 90/824
0.498 0.135 262.93 17 -0.35 0.14 12.17 15/1043 0.571 0.176 68.58 16 -0.50 0.17 13.36 51/1007 0.558 0.172 72.87 16 -0.50 0.17 10.03 69/983 0.137 0.113 41.32 16 -0.14 0.12 8.33 79/907 -0.377 0.124 41.62 16 0.39 0.12 6.68 90/824
FTD 3.491 3.983 3.08 17 -2.59 2.91 0.09 15/1043 0.134 1.522 15.22 16 0.72 1.55 0.39 51/1007 -1.391 2.118 12.23 16 2.24 1.57 0.53 69/983 -0.349 0.869 10.97 16 0.80 0.80 2.03 79/901 -0.685 1.034 22.83 16 1.01 0.93 2.62 89/819
0.521 0.908 3.77 17 -0.54 0.69 0.09 15/1043 0.189 0.421 9.35 16 -0.25 0.41 0.39 51/1007 0.107 0.497 14.20 16 -0.17 0.47 0.53 69/983 0.165 0.270 23.40 16 -0.18 0.27 0.72 79/901 0.153 0.507 24.74 16 -0.18 0.49 0.90 89/819
I  - wELECTIONS
WG 0.776 0.106 1130.65 17 -0.29 0.13 43.10 14/1115 0.080 0.252 100.83 16 0.15 0.28 96.95 51/1078 0.024 0.246 101.48 16 0.20 0.27 70.68 69/1048 0.071 0.223 46.71 16 0.13 0.24 59.01 80/977 0.275 0.207 49.86 16 -0.09 0.23 39.31 90/895
0.274 0.078 779.38 17 -0.34 0.10 43.10 14/1115 -0.325 0.104 174.23 16 0.11 0.11 96.95 51/1078 -0.312 0.095 179.66 16 0.10 0.11 70.68 69/1048 0.029 0.066 21.90 16 -0.06 0.07 64.52 80/977 -0.021 0.069 24.63 16 0.00 0.08 39.84 90/895
FD 2.378 3.213 6.47 17 -0.09 3.06 0.11 14/1115 -0.558 1.474 6.62 16 1.02 1.44 3.62 51/1078 -0.877 1.425 7.32 16 1.63 1.31 2.95 69/1048 -1.627 1.199 17.80 16 2.11 0.99 2.59 80/971 -2.238 1.648 25.06 16 2.68 1.26 2.32 90/889
-1.753 1.689 14.85 17 0.06 0.91 0.11 14/1115 0.184 0.417 3.31 16 -0.30 0.41 3.62 51/1078 0.161 0.377 6.26 16 -0.24 0.38 2.95 69/1048 -0.037 0.332 19.27 16 -0.02 0.33 2.18 80/971 0.044 0.383 17.07 16 0.03 0.03 32.88 90/889
TD 0.173 0.223 61.36 17 0.33 0.23 7.77 14/1043 -0.009 0.532 37.89 16 0.49 0.55 11.18 50/1007 0.017 0.544 37.25 16 0.45 0.55 8.39 68/983 0.568 0.708 45.70 16 -0.26 0.69 5.97 78/907 0.395 0.488 69.34 16 -0.07 0.49 5.24 89/824
-0.046 0.101 105.21 17 0.30 0.12 7.77 14/1043 0.976 0.293 65.41 16 -0.90 0.24 11.18 50/1007 1.001 0.296 59.27 16 -0.94 0.23 8.39 68/983 0.226 0.166 36.73 16 -0.23 0.16 5.99 78/907 -0.134 0.161 47.95 16 0.13 0.16 5.25 89/824
FTD 0.417 1.552 3.02 17 0.41 1.56 0.28 14/1043 0.457 0.767 7.01 16 0.35 0.77 0.84 50/1007 1.083 0.845 8.14 16 0.24 0.85 0.86 68/983 -0.233 1.184 10.92 16 0.68 1.12 2.10 78/901 -1.521 1.164 17.37 16 1.85 0.87 2.74 88/819
8.00 0.170 0.429 3.63 17 -0.23 0.42 0.28 14/1043 -0.034 0.196 14.11 16 -0.05 0.20 0.84 50/1007 0.058 0.214 13.08 16 -0.12 0.22 0.86 68/983 0.267 0.240 19.80 16 -0.29 0.24 0.91 78/901 0.337 0.259 9.33 16 -0.37 0.26 1.18 88/819
J - mwELECTIONS
WG 0.743 0.106 1132.26 17 -0.23 0.13 41.01 14/1115 -0.115 0.283 102.93 16 0.38 0.31 93.50 51/1078 -0.181 0.270 102.91 16 0.45 0.30 69.20 69/1048 -0.033 0.235 41.98 16 0.26 0.26 58.02 80/977 0.138 0.203 44.67 16 0.08 0.23 39.55 90/895
0.338 0.079 778.25 17 -0.43 0.10 41.01 14/1115 -0.218 0.104 161.39 16 -0.02 0.12 93.50 51/1078 -0.242 0.093 165.38 16 0.01 0.11 69.20 69/1048 0.031 0.061 24.18 16 -0.06 0.07 63.90 80/977 -0.032 0.061 30.61 16 0.01 0.07 40.78 90/895
FD 2.530 1.252 5.14 17 -2.18 1.18 0.66 14/1115 0.318 0.643 9.35 16 0.33 0.66 4.02 51/1078 0.428 0.679 10.65 16 0.32 0.68 3.19 69/1048 0.038 0.594 21.48 16 0.44 0.58 2.87 80/971 -0.433 0.624 24.27 16 0.89 0.58 2.61 90/889
-1.297 0.569 10.76 17 1.26 0.40 0.66 14/1115 0.060 0.202 3.59 16 -0.15 0.19 4.02 51/1078 0.013 0.176 7.44 16 -0.09 0.17 3.19 69/1048 -0.206 0.150 22.73 16 0.16 0.15 2.45 80/971 -0.168 0.149 22.91 16 0.03 0.03 34.11 90/889
TD 0.130 0.234 57.07 17 0.39 0.24 7.14 14/1043 -0.180 0.495 31.01 16 0.68 0.48 12.42 50/1007 0.011 0.485 30.15 16 0.47 0.47 9.43 68/983 0.007 0.494 43.88 16 0.32 0.49 6.27 78/907 0.005 0.355 40.57 16 0.34 0.35 6.04 89/824
-0.107 0.101 99.69 17 0.38 0.11 7.14 14/1043 0.720 0.222 75.03 16 -0.65 0.21 12.42 50/1007 0.597 0.204 82.98 16 -0.53 0.20 9.43 68/983 0.117 0.124 41.05 16 -0.12 0.13 6.23 78/907 -0.222 0.116 50.51 16 0.22 0.11 5.88 89/824
FTD 0.276 1.201 2.78 17 0.54 1.21 0.40 14/1043 0.059 0.636 10.06 16 0.76 0.63 0.85 50/1007 0.520 0.645 10.66 16 0.33 0.66 0.91 68/983 0.657 0.682 17.85 16 -0.22 0.69 2.23 78/901 -0.242 0.599 13.94 16 0.57 0.55 2.89 88/819






























































































































































  37table 6.A - ESTIMATES OF THE SPIKE COEFFICIENTS - FORMAL AND INFORMAL, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS
(1) base (2) fi + ft (3) controls (4) 12 lags (5) 24 lags
coef se test coef se test coef se test coef se test coef se test
1 - FORMAL
0.599 0.125 0.225 0.706 0.123 0.200 0.691 0.117 0.173 0.485 0.109 0.156 0.489 0.108 0.172
FD 0.486 0.127 0.178 0.726 0.112 0.152 0.757 0.111 0.151 0.470 0.089 0.120 0.427 0.090 0.129
0.112 0.079 0.132 -0.019 0.072 0.130 -0.067 0.033 0.084 -0.057 0.034 0.084 -0.044 0.034 0.093
0.827 0.128 0.188 0.830 0.128 0.186 0.886 0.124 0.173 0.525 0.108 0.149 0.363 0.095 0.139
FTD 0.865 0.120 0.139 0.881 0.119 0.137 0.903 0.118 0.136 0.480 0.089 0.110 0.336 0.074 0.098
-0.039 0.069 0.128 -0.051 0.068 0.127 -0.017 0.056 0.109 0.001 0.050 0.095 -0.058 0.042 0.090
2 - INFORMAL
0.296 0.213 0.435 0.182 0.585 0.142 0.476 0.130 0.537 0.146
FD 0.543 0.136 0.672 0.122 0.710 0.121 0.448 0.097 0.420 0.107
-0.247 0.139 -0.238 0.134 -0.126 0.090 -0.087 0.089 -0.001 0.098
0.559 0.173 0.574 0.171 0.551 0.160 0.379 0.140 0.415 0.114
FTD 0.678 0.122 0.686 0.123 0.701 0.123 0.344 0.092 0.257 0.081
-0.118 0.125 -0.112 0.126 -0.150 0.108 -0.045 0.102 0.013 0.091
3 - PRIVATE
0.467 0.120 0.337 0.661 0.111 0.263 0.679 0.107 0.229 0.464 0.096 0.188 0.446 0.094 0.202
FD 0.467 0.117 0.332 0.720 0.105 0.258 0.748 0.105 0.225 0.467 0.086 0.182 0.415 0.085 0.195
-0.001 0.045 0.137 -0.060 0.044 0.138 -0.070 0.032 0.049 -0.059 0.030 0.049 -0.013 0.035 0.054
0.796 0.119 0.211 0.806 0.117 0.210 0.825 0.114 0.194 0.478 0.091 0.169 0.347 0.080 0.155
FTD 0.833 0.115 0.205 0.847 0.115 0.204 0.870 0.114 0.190 0.451 0.087 0.163 0.318 0.069 0.148
-0.037 0.041 0.130 -0.041 0.040 0.129 -0.045 0.037 0.104 0.000 0.033 0.088 -0.015 0.033 0.082
4 - PUBLIC
0.836 0.329 0.447 0.262 0.627 0.219 0.463 0.188 0.517 0.209
FD 0.834 0.330 0.526 0.260 0.701 0.219 0.507 0.186 0.526 0.208
0.043 0.135 -0.147 0.139 -0.055 0.038 -0.039 0.040 -0.021 0.041
0.396 0.204 0.379 0.208 0.495 0.202 0.223 0.178 0.233 0.161
FTD 0.465 0.202 0.455 0.206 0.559 0.202 0.247 0.174 0.270 0.157
-0.213 0.122 -0.239 0.123 -0.148 0.101 -0.075 0.089 -0.077 0.077
1) Dependent variable is average hours worked for the working population, average hours worked for those employed and employment rate.  
2) Hours and Job elasticities add to Total elasticity for the static but not for the dynamic models:
3) Colum 1 shows raw correlations, and columns 2-5 add time and region fixed effects, controls, 12 and 24 lags of dependent variable, respectively.
4) PThe test column tests the equality of the coefficients between formal and informal, private and public.
5) Each panel has Within Groups (WG) and OLS on 1st (FD), 12th (TD) and 1st and 12th differences (FTD).
6) Time effects are modelled with year, seasonal-month, stabilization and 1988 structural break dummies.
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